Problems of COMMUNISM

New Purge in the Kremlin

RICHARD LOWENTHAL

The Year Since "October"

PAUL LANDY

PAUL IGNOTUS

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Guided Tourism in China

RICHARD L. WALKER

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Party Vs. State

The Permanent Revolution Is On Again

By Richard Lowenthal

EDITORS' NOTE: The spectacular purge of the top CPSU echelon last June—in which Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, along with lesser leading lights, fell victim to Nikita Khrushchev's ascendant power and wily manipulations in the party apparatus—confirmed long-obvious signs of severe dissension in the so-called "collective leadership" over the current course of post-Stalin (read Khrushchevian) policy. The complex issues involved in this newest shake-up have been the subject of widespread comment and analysis—none more incisive, in the view of these editors, than the essay presented below by the distinguished British writer Richard Lowenthal. It is reprinted here from the August issue of *Commentary* magazine (New York), through the courtesy of the publishers.

ON THE EVE of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917, the Soviet Union has been launched on yet another social revolution—on yet another turn of the wheel, that is, of the permanent revolution from above by which the rule of the Communist Party is maintained. This and nothing less is the meaning of the recent dramatic victory scored by Khrushchev over his opponents in the presidium of the party.

It is obvious to all that by eliminating his chief rivals, Khrushchev has ended the fiction of "collective leadership" and restored the primacy of the head of the party machine, familiar to us from Stalin's time. It is equally obvious that he has done so in the name of new policies—policies which he claims represent neither a return to Stalin's system, nor a repudiation of the main line of the Stalinist tradition, but a bold advance forward from Stalinism. What is not yet generally understood is just what these new policies are.

Yet it seems to this observer that the signs are plain enough for all to read. Khrushchev's primary objective is neither "destalinization," nor "decentralization," least of all "democratization." It is nothing less than the ending of the dualism of party and state machine by which the Soviet Union has been governed for the past four decades—the institution of direct rule over the country, including direct management of its economy, by party secretaries. The Soviet state is to "wither away" at last, as Lenin promised—but only in the technical sense of having its bureaucracy no longer controlled but replaced by that of the party.

It is a tremendous undertaking without example in the annals of modern totalitarianism, and it may fail. But let us first examine the evidence for saying that it has started.

DURING RECENT MONTHS, the Soviet Union has been without a "government" in the traditional sense of the term. Not only have 25 industrial ministries been dissolved; not only have the prime ministers of the 16 constituent republics been granted membership in the all-Union government, thus making it a representative rather than an executive body; but the life and soul of the government, the "inner cabinet" of deputy prime ministers, has disappeared, and nothing has taken its place—nothing, that is, on the governmental plane. Some of the former deputy premiers have become sec-

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tional heads in the reorganized Gosplan (State Planning Commission); five of them who were leading figures and also members of the party presidium have been demoted as a result of Khrushchev's purge (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin and Saburov). Only the everlasting Mikoyan and the new head of Gosplan, Y. Y. Kuzmin, are left with the title of "first deputy premier."

It may be objected that the real policy-making body was the party presidium all the time. Consider, then, the changes in the composition of the presidium. It has now been inflated to comprise 15 voting members and nine candidates—including all the eight members of the party's central secretariat. Only once before has the presidium been larger—after Stalin's last party congress, in November 1952, when 25 full members and 11 candidates were elected. But in that body of 36, the 10 members of the secretariat and three provincial party secretaries were balanced by 12 deputy premiers and four other ministers of the Union government, with Premier Stalin and Deputy Premier Malenkov combining functions in the government and the party secretariat. In the new presidium of 24, the eight members of the central secretariat, together with the first secretaries of Leningrad, Gorki, and Sverdlovsk, of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Latvia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan, add up to 16 representatives of the party machine, while the Union government is represented only by Premier Bulganin, Deputy Premier Mikoyan, Marshal Zhukov, and Ministers Pervukhin and Kosygin. The balance is gone; the men formally charged with carrying on the government are not in a position decisively to influence policy.

THIS DISORGANIZATION and demotion of the government is, of course, the direct consequence of Khrushchev's scheme for the reorganization of economic planning. The need for such a reorganization was recognized on all sides; its direction was bitterly contested—indeed it formed one of the two central issues in the struggle between Khrushchev and his opponents. It was the critics of Khrushchev who first raised the demand for an overhaul of the planning machinery (as well as a revision of current plans) last December, when Krushchev's authority stood lowest on the morrow of the Polish and Hungarian events. They called for more realistic targets, better coordination, and less disturbance of the plan by sudden "campaigns"—in fact, for more rationality and less propaganda; and they won, besides some investment cuts, the creation of a greatly strengthened "State Economic Commission" of high-powered economic administrators which was to submit its reform proposals in February. Yet by February, Khrushchev was politically on top again; he and not Pervukhin, the chairman of the commission, proposed the reforms, and got approval for an outline suggesting the creation of regional planning organs under control of the party. Between then and March 30, when Khrushchev published his theses, that idea had hardened into the proposal to make the regional "Councils for National Economy" the "basic link" in the new planning machinery under the Gosplan, and to abolish the industrial ministries of the Union and of the national republics altogether.

At its first appearance, this proposal was widely interpreted outside the USSR as a step towards "decentralization" of the economy in the Yugoslav sense, however strongly Khrushchev himself denied this intention; nor was it recognized that the sudden switch from having recently strengthened the State Economic Commission to replacing it by a Gosplan with increased powers was due to the objections raised against Khrushchev's scheme by the experienced economic administrators attached to the commission. But when the scheme was presented to the Supreme Soviet in May (with minor amendments preserving, for the time being and with reduced powers, a few industrial ministers in the Union and republican governments) and when the economic councils came to be appointed subsequently, two things became clear—that none of Khrushchev's presidium colleagues concerned with economic administration had supported him in the discussion, and that the presidents of the new economic councils were generally party secretaries—usually the second secretaries of the regions concerned. What had started as a drive for more economic rationality had turned into a drive for more direct party rule in the economic field.

This was not at all inconsistent with Khrushchev's record. After he took over as first secretary of the party, he became noteworthy for the attention he paid to technical economic detail—to methods of sowing potatoes, to the value of planting maize for fodder, and to the advantages of building with concrete. Some Western observers hailed him on that account as a practical man who had no time for ideological nonsense and was turning the Communist Party into a kind of glorified polytechnic. Yet against this there was the evidence of his passion for foreign travel and speech-making—the evidence, in fact, that he is a primitive but perfectly genuine believer in the Leninist concept of world revolution. The ideal he put before the young generation of *apparatchiki* was that of a man who would combine a universal competence in the technical problems of production with a perfect Marxist-Leninist understanding of the international scene. It may be a difficult ideal to

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fulfill, but there is no reason to doubt that Khrushchev believes in it sincerely. In one and the same speech at the Twentieth CPSU Congress last year, he developed the advantages of taking power by such "legal" and "parliamentary" methods as were employed in Czechoslovakia in 1948, and suggested that party regional secretaries ought to be paid salaries in proportion to the production successes of their region! The latter proposal seemed strange enough at a time when a formal separation of party and administration was still the official doctrine; it makes perfect sense in the framework of Khrushchev's revolution.

"Let a single flower bloom!"

—From *The Observer* (London), July 1957.
(Permission to reproduce must be obtained from the publisher.)

BUT DOES the revolution itself make sense? Khrushchev is turning the top-heavy administrative machinery of a gigantic command economy upside down. He is breaking overnight the customary links, thus clogging the well-worn channels of command; he is driving all the most competent higher administrators into frantic opposition without arousing enthusiasm from the managers in the field, who still will be under strict orders, but from new and usually less competent, though somewhat nearer people. He is, in short, running the risk of destroying the over-complicated mechanism of detailed planning from the center, without daring to replace it by bold reliance on market forces and managerial initiative within a broadly planned framework. And he is taking sole responsibility for the consequences —even to the point of appointing one of his assistants from the party secretariat, a man without high-level experience of decision-making, as head of Gosplan and first deputy premier!

What, then, impelled him along this course? The old planning system was certainly creaking, but its crisis was not desperate. It is true that following the immediate postwar reconstruction period, the rates of Soviet industrial growth had gradually slowed down; this was inevitable since the phase of "primitive accumulation" had ended, since industry could no longer rely on a steady influx of new millions of workers from the countryside, and since even natural population growth had slowed down. It had been the common conviction of the post-Stalin leaders that such a situation required increased attention to the raising of output per man-shift, and hence increased reliance on incentives rather than coercion; the gradual transformation of the labor camps into forced settlements of "free" workers and the material concessions to both workers and peasants had their origin in this conviction. For the same reasons, there was certainly growing pressure to eliminate the shocking bureaucratic waste of the command economy, to improve cost accounting and to decentralize the power of decision. There was pressure, in other words to move toward greater economic rationality by adopting a broadly planned market economy, as the Yugoslavs had done as early as 1953. But that is not what Khrushchev is doing.

Must we explain his scheme, then, purely in terms of the struggle for personal power? The "rational" solution, with its greater scope for the managers, might have appealed to Malenkov and some of the "technocrats" in the Economic Commission; the old "Stalinists," like Molotov and Kaganovich, would have tended to defend the old forms of centralized departmental control. Did Khrushchev devise his scheme—with its reliance on his own appointees and natural supporters, the regional party secretaries—as the best means to defeat both groups of opponents and secure full control? That, I believe, is at least part of the truth; for even though the urgency of the economic situation was not desperate, that of Khrushchev's personal situation last winter probably was.

At the December plenum, Malenkov and the Stalinist "conservatives" seem to have united in blaming Khrushchev's rash advances to Tito and his "destalinization" speech at the Twentieth CPSU Congress for having

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lowered Russia's international authority and produced the upheaval in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev had his back to the wall; he may have been saved only by Chinese support for his views that the unity of the Soviet bloc could not be restored by a simple return to Stalin's "great power chauvinism," and that a precarious compromise with Gomulka which maintained unity in foreign policy was preferable to another Hungary nearer home. He saw that unless he got rid of his opponents, his opponents would sooner or later get rid of him; and just as Stalin took the great foreign policy defeat of his early years—the break-up of the alliance between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang in 1927—as a signal to force the surrender or expulsion of his critics in the same year, so Khrushchev may have resolved to force an issue of his own choice as soon as he got a chance.

It was, then, the crucial decisions demanded by the East European revolution of last autumn which led to irreconcilable conflict within the "collective leadership," and which made the present crisis inevitable. The planning reform was the issue chosen by Khrushchev himself for fighting it out. But the reform plainly raised even more resistance than Khrushchev had expected; and the question remains how so risky, so patently irrational a scheme could win at all against such strongly entrenched opposition.

THE ANSWER, in this writer's view, is that a "rational" solution of the problem of economic planning was—and is—in conflict with the interests of single-party rule. Khrushchev chose this issue for the decisive inner-party struggle, and won on it because his policy coincides with the party's interest in preserving its power in the new industrial society it has helped to create.

A genuine economic "decentralization"—the granting of freedom for managerial initiative and the forces of supply and demand—would deprive the party of a tremendous lever of power over the new managerial class. It would strengthen the feeling—which inevitably has grown with the development of a modern industry, army, and administration—that the party is a kind of parasitic appendix to this modern society, no longer needed for its proper functioning. If accompanied—as it must be in order to create a genuine market economy—by the abolition of forced agricultural deliveries, it would reduce the party's power over the peasants to the same extent. (When both steps were taken in Yugoslavia, the managerial class was still very weak, but the growth in peasant self-confidence and independence proved very marked and led fairly soon to a dissolution of most collective farms. The difference was, of course, that the pressure toward economic rationality in the Yugoslav situation was much more severe than in the USSR today).

The Soviet Communist Party has been concerned with this problem of the new industrial upper class ever since it emerged from the first Five Year Plan. At that time, in 1934, the party still contained many of the old revolutionaries from the working class and prewar intelligentsia, while the new upper class had developed largely outside the party. It was the basic function of Stalin's blood purge of the 1930's to overcome this discrepancy; by eliminating the traditional revolutionary element from the party and driving the new bureaucracy into its fold, he created a personal union between the organ of power and the class of privilege. Once the profiteers of the revolution had joined the Jacobin Club, there could be no more Thermidor!

Twenty years later, history has shown that despite the personal union between the ruling party and the governing bureaucracy, the division of function remains a source of conflict. The manager and economic administrator, even though a party member, tends to think in terms of personal security, social stability, and economic rationality: confident in his own competence, he feels sure he could hold an equal job even if there was no party—and perhaps with less troublesome interference. The party secretary or editor, even though a privileged bureaucrat, tends to think in terms of power and its ideological justification: he sees industry and the army, the whole modern Soviet society, as the creation of the party, and the end of party control to him would be the end of everything. But with the passage of time since the revolution, and with the discredit into which the party has fallen thanks to its purges, vacillations and abuses, and lately thanks to the shock of the East European revolution, his outlook has become less typical and more isolated.

Now Khrushchev is trying once again to bridge the gap—if a union of persons was not enough, a union of functions must be created. No doubt he hopes to get along without a blood purge of comparable scale; though Malenkov and Molotov have been attacked for forming an "anti-party group" and, more ominously, for their share in the frame-ups of the past, the recalcitrant economic bureaucrats are not yet being pilloried as "enemies of the people." But what will Khrushchev do if his scheme breaks down?

BEFORE PROCEEDING further, it may be useful to try to relate the present analysis to the discussion of over-all trends in Soviet society now going on among Western students of Communist affairs. Leaving aside

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the optimists who foresee "democratization" and the professional exhorters who look at every change in the Soviet orbit as mere "trickery" designed to deceive the unwary, there remain two principal approaches. On one side are those who argue that the growth of a modern industrial society with universal literacy and widespread technical competence, and of a self-confident new upper and middle class, will exert a pressure toward more rational methods of rule which is ultimately bound to prove irresistible—that as society matures and revolutionary fervor subsides, the regime itself is bound to "mellow." On the other side are those who stress the unique character of the totalitarian party regime, which reacts to social pressures neither by giving in nor by resisting change, but by manipulating the inevitable changes in such a way as to preserve its own power and dynamism—in a manner, that is, which remains revolutionary and "irrational" from a purely economic point of view.

What has been said so far constitutes an implicit criticism of the first-named approach: it is the "irrational" Khrushchev with his party bosses, not the "rational" Malenkov with his managers and economic administrators, who has won the latest round; and the reason is to be found precisely in the logic of self-preservation of the party regime, which, after forty years, still remains a revolutionary regime in its origin and justification. Revolutionary regimes do not mellow; they continue until they are overthrown and their social and economic results are incorporated into a different kind of regime. The people may long since have lost their faith in the revolutionary shibboleths; but the party cannot abandon its ideology without abandoning power. The party leadership maintains this power by using it to twist society into an artificial preconceived pattern, by allowing none of the basic classes to settle down in stability and security, by reacting to every pressure from growing social forces with another turn of the screw of permanent revolution from above. After the recovery of peasant agriculture in the 1920's came the forced collectivization; after the rise of the new managerial class in the 1930's the blood purge; after the new consolidation of this class in the 1950's, following Stalin's death, Khrushchev's move toward direct party rule. . . .

Yet there is something dangerously one-sided in this picture. The party, after all, is not God; if it does make history, it cannot do so arbitrarily. Not all the changes to which it reacts were foreseen in its theory; not all the measures it takes were part of its original program. If it seeks to respond to every pressure in such a way as to preserve its power, there is no preordained guarantee that it will always succeed in doing so. The true history of the Soviet system is certainly not that of the automatic modification of the regime by outside social and economic forces, but neither is it that of the pure unfolding of the grand design of the totalitarian regime: it is the history of dynamic interaction between the logic of economic and social growth and the logic of totalitarianism—an interaction which frequently takes the form of conflict, and in which measures taken in order to preserve the regime may well have the unforeseen effect of undermining it. The party, we said, cannot mellow; but it may fail.

LET US NOW apply this "dialectical" approach to the history of the past four years. On the morrow of Stalin's death, the party was at its lowest point in vitality and prestige; Malenkov, when faced by the "collective" with the choice between leadership of the government or of the party machine, seems voluntarily to have preferred the premiership; and the initiative passed for a time to state organs. (Among the 10 members and four candidates of the party presidium as then reconstructed, there was only one representative of the central party secretariat—Khrushchev—and two provincial party secretaries, whereas there were, besides Premier Malenkov himself, four "first deputy premiers," three deputy premiers, and one minister—an imbalance as strong as the present one, but in the opposite direction.)

But while Malenkov busied himself to restore confidence and keep the economy going by material concessions, Khrushchev set to work to revive the party. The most urgent condition for this was the downgrading of the secret police, which, by being used as the instrument of Stalin's personal rule, had come to exert power over the constituted party organs. The execution of Beria and Abakumov and the accompanying campaign enabled Khrushchev gradually to reassert the primacy of the party machine, to oust Malenkov from the premiership, and finally at the Twentieth Congress to pack the Central Committee with his own nominees.

Yet at this very same congress, Khrushchev was made aware of the extent of the accumulated social pressure for greater security and stability—a pressure which had had a chance to make itself felt after the downgrading of the secret police, and which was now turned on the party itself—largely from inside. Behind the pressure was the obvious fear that the revival of the party, and of the control of the First Secretary over the Central Committee, would lead eventually to the rise of another Stalin, with all the well-

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remembered horrors of his rule. So strong was this fear that Khrushchev had to appease it with a triple moral guarantee. First, by his "secret" speech he "disclosed" Stalin's methods and explicitly disowned the doctrine on which the blood purges were based—the theory avowing the "sharpening of the class struggle" with every step forward in the construction of "socialism," which could conveniently be used to discover new "class enemies" for every new phase in the permanent revolution. Second, he allowed opponents whom he had already defeated politically—Malenkov on the question of economic policy, Molotov on the concessions to Yugoslavia and the satellites and on the partial disavowal of Stalin—to be reelected to the party presidium, although in his new, hand-picked Central Committee he could have prevented their election even then. Third, he had the head of the army, Marshal Zhukov (who had become deputy war minister when Stalin died and war minister when Malenkov fell), elected to the presidium as a candidate—an unprecedented concession to the political weight of the army.

The essential point is that all these concessions were *not* made for strictly inner-party reasons: they amounted to a peace offer to the nation's leading strata, and to the other pillars of the administration, by the party machine. These elements were, in fact, assured that if they put up with the restored primacy of the party machine, there would be no more insecurity, no more hunt for "enemies," no return to paranoia as a system of government; there would, on the contrary, be a respectful hearing for the spokesmen of the economic bureaucracy and the army within the highest party councils. The "compromise," such as it was, was reflected in the balance within the new party presidium: among 11 members and six candidates, there were eight government members (Bulganin, six deputy premiers, and Zhukov), five members of the central secretariat, and two provincial party secretaries.

It is this compromise which Khrushchev has now torn up, this balance which he has shattered. The truce between the party machine and Soviet society is broken: the permanent revolution is on again. Rather than submit to the gradual erosion of the party's primacy by the economic bureaucracy, which a rational solution of the planning problems would have implied, Khrushchev has prefered to declare war on the economic bureaucracy and to attempt direct party rule in economic life.

Now, as at the Twentieth Congress, it was the party machine which decided the outcome. But the two opposite decisions—then for a compromise in order to restore confidence, now for the repudiation of that compromise in order to prevent the gradual undermining of party rule—are not just the result of Khrushchev's Machiavellian trickery: they express a genuine dilemma. The social pressures have become stronger, after all, with the growth of a modern industrial society. The road of concessions leads ultimately to the Thermidor. The road of open defiance of the new social forces leads to the party's growing isolation.

Traditionally, Soviet administration has rested on four main hierarchical pillars—the party machine, the secret police, the economic bureaucracy and the army. Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, they have all been represented in varying proportions in the highest policy-making organ, the politburo or party presidium, though most of the time the army was represented only by a political minister. After Beria's fall, the downgraded secret police ceased to have top-level representation; now the spokesmen of the economic bureaucracy have disappeared. Khrushchev and his party bosses are left alone with the representative of the last pillar—the army.

(Purge list reads: Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich)

--By Flannery, *The Evening Sun* (Baltimore, Md.), July 9, 1957.

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It has been hinted by Soviet sources, and stated outright by Western commentators, that Marshal Zhukov played a decisive role in the latest battle for power. Even assuming that the semi-official account of Khrushchev's loss of a majority in the party presidium is true—and it is quite conceivable that there was a last desperate rallying of resistance on the eve of the final coming into force of Khrushchev's scheme, scheduled for July 1—there was hardly more required of the Marshal than to sit quiet: in the absence of intervention by outside forces, a struggle between the majority of the presidium and the secretariat was bound to end with the victory of the latter, because the secretariat could always rely on the Khrushchevite majority of the Central Committee. Yet even Khrushchev's opponents, being life-long party men, probably would have recoiled from calling for army intervention in order to get ride of the First Secretary before the Central Committee could be convened; if they had tried and failed, they certainly would not have gotten off with mere expulsion from the Central Committee.

The Marshal, then, was not called upon explicitly to decide between the party leaders; but everybody knew that he could have swayed the decision—that he had become the implicit arbiter of their dispute. By choosing not to act, by demonstrating his loyalty to the party statutes as handled by the machine, he justified the confidence placed in him by Khrushchev, who has allowed him persistently to reduce the role of the army political administration at a time when party control was being strengthened in every other sphere. As a result, the former dualism between the various branches of state administration on one side, and the party organs controlling them on the other, is coming to be replaced by a dualism of a very different kind—between a party directly running the other branches of government, and a virtually independent army united to it at the top.

The risks of this arrangement are obvious. They must appear even greater when it is recalled that the unity of the party leadership is by no means assured even now. One of the most sinister consequences of Khrushchev's costly victory is the breakdown of the mutual amnesty which the leaders originally had granted each other for their participation in Stalin's crimes. As late as Khrushchev's "secret" speech, the role of the other surviving leaders in Stalin's murderous purges was hushed up almost as well as Khrushchev's own. Now Malenkov has been attacked for his share in the 1949 "Leningrad affair," and Molotov and Kaganovich for their participation in the purges of the 1930's. These look like opening moves in a death struggle; the sequel may well be new charges of sabotage if Khrushchev's scheme results in economic breakdown.

But could the Soviet Union of today stand even a partial repetition of the horrors of twenty years ago? Could a party which has once before gone through it all, which has admitted how callously the charges were faked and how brutally the confessions were extorted, and which has now fatally weakened its links with the leading strata of the country, impose another blood purge at this stage? Would not the call for a strong man who could stop the bloodshed and the ideological nonsense and restore law and order become irresistible if addressed to the only possible candidate for that role—the head of the army?

Revolutions have ended in this way before. We cannot, of course, forecast that the Soviet regime must go the same way. But we can state that the dilemma of the party regime has reached a stage where every measure taken to insure its survival increases the danger to it from another quarter. By knocking away the other pillars—the secret police and the economic bureaucracy—the regime has threatened its own stability. The last pillar may well outlive the collapse of the building.

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October: One Year After

EDITORS' NOTE: On November 7th the Communist world will observe the fortieth anniversary of the "October Revolution" of 1917. In Moscow preparations are already underway for a gala celebration, complete with parades, displays of military power, red flags and the usual round of proliferous speech-making: the Kremlin leaders (with a few conspicuous new absences) will once more proclaim to the world the glorious achievements of Soviet socialism and hail the "liberation" of neighboring peoples now in the Communist fold.

For two of those neighbors, however, the "October revolution" will have a second, very different meaning this fall. In Hungary, a hard-pressed populace must mark the passage of a year since its valiant, tragically costly effort to throw off the Communist yoke, before it was "liberated" anew by Soviet tanks. Red flags will fly in Budapest on November 7, by order of the regime, but for most Hungarians they can only symbolize the black days—and months—of the revolution's aftermath. In articles below three Hungarians, writers and journalists by profession, who personally lived through the uprising and subsequently escaped to the West, comment on vital elements in Hungary's situation today. The first, by Paul Landy, analyzes the overall impact and effects of the Kadar regime's neo-Stalinist program; the second, by a writer who chooses to remain unnamed, reviews the career of Kadar as a clue to his present Quisling role; the third, by Paul Ignotus, relates the infamous history of the AVH, leaving no doubt as to why this secret police arm of the Communists was a main target of pent-up popular feeling last fall.

For the Polish people there will be still another "October" anniversary. A year ago Poland, perilously close to the fate of Hungary, managed to effect a partial, "peaceful" revolution against the most humiliating aspects of Soviet domination. The country is still in the hands of avowed Communists, but Communists who have dared to demand a free hand from Moscow in directing Poland's affairs and to countenance a greater measure of freedom in various areas of Polish internal life. In a fourth article below, Zbigniew Brzezinski of Harvard University deals with the resultant political climate in Poland today, drawing on the first-hand impressions and contacts of a recent two-month stay.

Hungary Since the Revolution

By Paul Landy

TODAY, LESS THAN a year after the dramatic events which thrust it suddenly into the world headlines, Hungary has slipped back into relative obscurity. Yet, what has transpired there in the post-revolutionary period, even if little noticed by the general public, has been just as vital and revealing as the October revolution itself. The deepest significance of that explosion lay in the fact that it carried to the farthest point to date the process of disintegration in the Soviet East European empire. Similarly, post-revolutionary Hungary derives its crucial importance from the fact that it has become a testing ground for determining whether this disintegrative process can be effectively arrested through the re-application of neo-Stalinist policies of repression.

Strange as it now seems in retrospect, few thought in the immediate wake of the revolution that the Kadar government would seriously attempt to turn the clock back. The regime itself, in a desperate effort to rally popular support during the initial period of chaos and confusion, held forth promises calculated to encourage hope that some of the hard-won gains of the revolution would be preserved. But when it became evident

Mr. Landy, a writer and editor by profession, joined thousands of his countrymen in fleeing Hungary after the collapse of the revolution last October. He is now in Vienna writing for the United Press Agency and for various Western papers.

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that promises alone would not induce the workers, intellectuals, and youth to support a government which they thoroughly distrusted, the regime began shifting to a quite different tack. The early pledges of reform were scrapped; police repression and "thought control" were reinstituted in a concerted drive to stamp out revolutionary ferment; the necessity of monolithic, one-party rule was emphatically reasserted.

Hungary under Kadar thus presents the strangely anomalous spectacle of a country in which a minuscule ruling class, almost totally without support among the masses of the people, is attempting to recreate without any essential change the very system which was repudiated and toppled to the ground by the popular uprising of last October. This phenomenon not only contrasts sharply with the situation of Poland since its own October "revolution", but also seems at variance with the general direction of Soviet policy.

Political Promises Betrayed

Implicit in the Kadar government's record since it assumed power under the shadow of Soviet guns is its calculated use of the old tactics of carrot and stick. The regime's initial promises were clearly aimed at quenching the still flickering fires of revolutionary opposition in order that it might gain time to reorganize the party and the secret police. In the political sphere, none of these pledges has been carried out.

The Kadar government, in its broadcast declaration of policy upon assuming power on November 4, announced as its first objective "to secure our national independence and our country's sovereignty." Kadar himself, in a radio address the same day, declared that after the restoration of order the whole question of the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary would be made the subject of negotiations with the other Warsaw Pact signatories. The official organ of the regime, *Nepszabadsag*, was even more explicit, declaring on November 18 that "the independence of our country demands that no foreign troops be stationed on Hungarian soil."

The hopes encouraged by these pronouncements were dashed by the regime's subsequent acts. On March 29, 1957, a joint Hungarian-Soviet declaration affirmed that the two governments deemed it "absolutely necessary that . . . Soviet troops should be temporarily stationed in Hungary." An agreement signed on May 27 with respect to the status of the Soviet forces stipulated that its provisions would remain in force "as long as Soviet troops are stationed in Hungary," but it failed to mention any withdrawal date. Kadar underscored these obvious tactics of evasion by declaring on April 2 that "Soviet troops will remain here as long as their presence is needed."

Meanwhile, the official press launched a concerted propaganda campaign designed to justify the Soviet armed intervention of last November and the continued presence of Soviet troops. Geza Kassai, an arch-Stalinist spokesman of the regime, wrote in *Nepszabadsag* (April 14, 1957):

The events of last October-November proved that in certain situations the armed help of another socialist state is not only right and necessary, but that to request such help is a patriotic duty, and the granting of the request an international duty.

A few days later the renegade Social Democratic leader, Arpad Szakasits, echoed the same line in even more extreme terms:

The Kadar government can proudly claim responsibility for having requested Soviet help. . . . The armed help of the Soviet Union will be recorded on the most shining pages of the world's history.

Equally conspicuous has been the Kadar regime's failure to carry out its November 4 promise of a coalition government embracing non-Communist party leaders, much less Kadar's declaration of November 15 favoring not only a multi-party system but "free, honest elections." On April 26, 1957, five months after the revolution, *Nepszabadsag* sought to justify the continuation of Communist one-party rule by arguing retroactively that the possible non-Communist partners in a coalition government had been unwilling, at the time the initial promises were made, to cooperate on the basis of the Kadar program. The newspaper added:

We did not want coalition for coalition's sake, but coalition for the sake of socialism. The reappearance of other parties would have given legal camouflage to anti-socialist forces . . .

Accordingly, the regime has merely revived the pre-revolutionary device of the "People's Front" under strict party control, and it even maintains that a "multi-party system such as in China or Poland" is not permissible under the "special conditions" existing in Hungary. Moreover, far from instituting "free elections," the government has held none at all since the revolution; when the mandate of the existing parliament expired in May, rubber-stamp legislation prolonged its tenure for two more years in disregard of constitutional provisions.

The backtracking of the regime is evident in other areas as well. Compulsory study of Russian and of Marxism-Leninism has been reinstituted in the schools. More important, the workers' councils which sprang up during the revolution, and which received official recognition in the early days of the Kadar regime, have been reduced to an empty farce. First, the central and regional councils were abolished; then, the authority of the individual

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councils was curtailed, reducing them to mere advisory bodies without control over the factory managements. According to reliable estimates, some 300 workers' council members were thrown into prison or concentration camps.

By June 1957, some party spokesmen were airing the ominous view that even the legality of the councils was "controversial" because they had come into being as products of the "counterrevolution." Officially, however, the regime continues to tolerate their existence while taking the position—enunciated at the national party conference of June 27-29—that their functions cannot be defined until after full debate and that, at present, "the uppermost task is the strengthening of the trade unions." Kadar's later reiteration that "the direction of the whole economy must be strictly centralized" underscored the unlikelihood that the councils will ever be given significant authority.[1]

Economic Reversal

While the early political concessions of the regime were purely verbal promises that remained unfulfilled, it did, at the outset, grant substantial concessions in certain economic areas. For the benefit of the peasants, whose relative calm was one of its biggest assets, the government proclaimed that there would be no forcible attempt to reconstitute the 2,455 collective farms (out of a total of 3,954) which had been dissolved by the action of their members during the revolution; and it also allowed the Nagy government's abolition of compulsory farm deliveries to the state to remain in force. The middle strata of society were benefited by the relaxation of restrictions on the establishment of private shops and by light taxation of the private sector. Besides recognition of the workers' councils, industrial workers were accorded an average ten percent wage increase.

In the economic sphere, too, however, there has been a noticeable retightening of the screws. Under renewed pressure from the regime, the number of collective farms had climbed back from its low point to 2,584 by July 1, 1957, and the tax burden borne by the peasantry has become increasingly heavy. The only concessions which they still enjoy are the continued ban on compulsory farm deliveries and a slightly more liberal market economy for agricultural produce. As late as July 22, the government's intention not to reintroduce the compulsory delivery system was reiterated, but it remains to be seen whether the promise will be kept.

The other groups which benefited from the regime's early concessions have, if anything, fared worse than the peasantry. As the condition of the economy steadily deteriorated, the party-controlled press began calling for the reestablishment of a "healthy balance" between wages and productivity to avoid "sacrificing the future." This was the prelude to the government's reintroduction on August 1, 1957, of the hated old system of shock-workers and production norms, which meant in effect a flat ten percent cut in industrial wages. At the same time, the workers in a number of factories were ordered to pay back "unjustified wage increases." [2] The moderate taxes levied on private shopowners in the first six months have likewise been replaced by heavy ones, and this relatively small group—by official count, only 37,000 in all—is the target of continual attack in the press.

Despite the regime's efforts to revive production, the Hungarian economy is now in a worse state of crisis than it was on the eve of the revolution. Accumulated reserve stocks of goods have tumbled, future export receipts have been mortgaged, and immense strains have developed on the consumer goods market and in the trade balance of payments. By the admission of Jenoe Incze, Minister of Foreign Trade, Hungary's large unfavorable trade balance can be covered only by the "brotherly help" of the Communist

[1] *Nepszabadsag*, July 27, 1957.
[2] *Ibid.* August 1, 1957.

A FEAR OF HUMOR . . .

Marton Greiner of Pocsa, in an open letter, states he visited a tavern at Villany in the company of a friend. While at the bar they overheard several men telling jokes. The stories were followed by bursts of laughter . . .

Listening to the stories the two of them, loyal Communists, realized the jokes were about our people's democratic regime, its leaders and its measures.

The enemy withdrew after the defeat, but it works on with ridicule and slander. . . . Let us keep watch over the enemies of the people's power.

—Item in Naplo [*Diary*], *newspaper in Pecs, Hungary, May 24, 1957.*



Captions on knives **(clockwise from *"gyava"*): Coward, Demagogue, Not Active, Active, White, Red, Maximalist, Opportunist, Left-winger, Right-winger.**
Caption below: **Well, at least I've survived this far . .**

—From *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), February 28, 195

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bloc countries. This outside aid undoubtedly explains why it has been possible to stave off the complete collapse of the economy, but it obviously provides no basis for a lasting economic recovery.

Who Runs Hungary?

In view of the fact that the Kadar regime from its inception has ruled in manifest defiance of the will of almost the entire nation, the question poses itself: what groups *did* give the regime their support and thus become the governing class of post-revolutionary Hungary? It would obviously be absurd to suppose that a mere handful of Soviet-designated stooges could by themselves run the entire machinery of state.

Quite naturally, the regime found its staunchest supporters among those whose personal fortunes and security were indissolubly linked with the power and affluence of the Communist Party. They had a vested interest in the old order, and to them the vital question posed by the revolution was whether their way of life was to survive or go down the drain. They comprised primarily the members of the party, government and army bureaucracies—in a nutshell, the privileged class of the supposedly classless Communist society. Though tiny in relation to total population, the size of this administrative machine is still considerable, and its fidelity to Kadar was a key factor in the quick reorganization of the Communist power apparatus.

In addition, the bulk of the present rank-and-file party membership can be regarded as active supporters of the regime, though they are motivated more by fear than by enthusiasm, by self-interest rather than Communist conviction. Since the revolution, however, only 345,000 out of the total 900,000 pre-revolutionary Communist Party members have re-enrolled, indicating a sharp narrowing of the regime's popular base.[3] All in all, the ruling class in Hungary today may be roughly estimated at not more than 400,000, or four percent of the national population.

Even more than by the drop in party membership, communism's precarious position in Hungary is evidenced by the basic change that has taken place in the party itself. Gone are the revolutionary élan, the cherished illusions, the dizzy hopes. The party has largely become a sterile organization of *apparatchiki* and bureaucrats who watch their step, make loud professions of party loyalty, and monotonously repeat propaganda slogans. According to official statistics, the intellectual component of the party has significantly dropped from 19.4 percent before the revolution to 6.9 percent at present.[4]

As for the top leadership, Janos Kadar is a "career" party functionary, a typical second-fiddler of long standing, who never has had the stature of a Rakosi or a Nagy and who now has lost the remnants of whatever limited popularity he did enjoy. The sympathy which he might have gained as a former scapegoat imprisoned by Rakosi has been completely wiped out by his humiliating comeback behind Zhukov's tanks, and by his despicable countenancing of police brutality and terror during his eleven-month reign. According to reports which continue to leak out of Hungary concerning the state of public feeling, Kadar's closest associates enjoy an equal measure of popular disdain: these include Gyula Kallai, who as Minister of Education is the regime's "ideological pope"; Gyoergy Marosan, renegade Social Democrat, who serves as Minister of State; the aging First Deputy Premier Ferenc Muennich; and "coming men" like Bela Biszku and Geza Revesz, who respectively head the Interior and Defense ministries. The pro-Stalinist old guard is represented by Deputy Premier Antal Apro; by Karoly Kiss, Secretary of the Central Committee; by Istvan Friss and others. Their guiding spirit is Jozsef Revai, an ex-

. . . AND A HUMOR OF FEAR



Csakhogy kibírtam eddig! . . .

[3] *Ibid.* June 29, 1957.
[4] *Ibid.*

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tremely able old Communist, former "third man" in Rakosi's command. At the June party conference Revai made a plea for the rehabilitation of the old guard, complaining to the delegates that "many old Communists live in an inner emigration." [5] Revai was readmitted to the Central Committee; but for the moment the latter stands solidly behind Kadar.

While both Kadar's supporters and the old guard put main emphasis on the fight against the "revisionists," there is evidence that an embittered behind-the-scenes struggle for the leadership is going on. As *Nepszabadsag* put it:

It was easier to preserve the unity of the party under the direct threat of the counterrevolution than now, when the question of power is decided. Personal tensions, moods, inclinations, views, secret political meetings in coffee houses and in flats are reported. These dangerous signs threaten the barely-established unity of the party.[6]

The main bone of contention between the feuding groups within the party is the critical reappraisal of the past. While the old guard tries partially to exculpate the Rakosi-Geroe group from the responsibility for October, the present leadership is rigidly following the December resolution of the temporary Central Committee, which singled out, among other reasons for the collapse of the ancien regime, the "anti-Leninist, sectarian mistakes" of Rakosi-Geroe. In the present writer's view, this debate is closely connected with the struggle for personal power and does not represent a clash between a more liberal and a Stalinist ideology. No Stalinist could have been more ruthless than Kadar in stamping out the opposition to his regime or in reconstructing the pillars of the former system of rule. Characteristic of the Kadar group and its outlook was Bela Biszku's statement last May that the old Stalinists had not been severe enough in crushing the enemies of socialism, that the greatest mistake of the past was the "insufficient application of the dictatorship of the proletariat." [7]

The June party conference was the scene of a clash between these opposing interpretations of the causes of last October, both viewpoints clashing in turn with the opinions of the "revisionists" who wish to preserve some of October's achievements. Gyula Kallai admitted this lack of unity in inner party life, stressing the need for a stubborn fight against both the Stalinist and revisionist deviations, but warning that the "chief danger" is revisionism, "which is a right-wing deviation tied to the ideology of the counterrevolution." [8]

After the ousting of the Malenkov-Molotov group in Moscow, Marosan issued a warning meant for both the revisionists and the old guard: "In defense of our unity we are not afraid to cope with anybody." [9] It would seem that for the time being, however, the Kadar group is firmly in the saddle, and that it enjoys the confidence of Khrushchev, who several times has pointedly made clear his support of Kadar.

The clash of opinions in the top echelon is probably tempered somewhat by the necessity of resisting pressures toward liberalization coming from below. At the lower levels of the party even the faintest echoes of discontent are being suppressed with an iron hand. On February 8 Gyula Kallai declared:

We are determined not to succumb to any demand, for little concessions would be followed by bigger ones and all these could lead only to a new October 23rd.[10]

All of the party's resolutions and the statements at the party conference in June have reflected the basic attitude of the Kadar group: in the case of Hungary there is no middle course between liberalization (which would lead to another eruption like October), and a return to the old forms of prerevolutionary communism. Therefore the choice must be the latter—but with "new" methods and leaders. The old pattern can be adapted with slight modifications, using as convenient scapegoats for all past and recent ills the crimes, respectively, of Rakosi and of Nagy. Nagy is blamed for having gone too far and finally betraying socialism, Rakosi for not having gone far enough and committing serious "blunders."

The Rewriting of History

Events during the last eleven months have underlined the Orwellian thesis that a society becomes totalitarian "when its ruling class has lost its functions but succeeds in clinging to power by force and fraud." Force and fraud are the main staples of the Kadar regime. No lie has been too big to be put forward as an historical and ideological justification of the regime:

It is not true that the party fell to pieces on October 23rd. We are convinced that a few thousand armed workers would have been enough to disperse the counterrevolutionary gangs together with their American journalists and photoreporters.[11]

Again:

[It was] not the youth [who were] the basis of the counter-

[5] *Ibid.*, July 9, 1957.
[6] *Ibid.*, April 23, 1957.
[7] *Ibid.*, May 29, 1957.
[8] *Tasadalmi Szenle*, July-August, 1957.
[9] *Nepszabadsag*, July 7, 1957.
[10] *Ibid.*, February 8, 1957.
[11] Gyula Kallai, in *Nepszabadsag*, April 10, 1957.

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A leggyorsabb megoldás

Gerő Sándor rajza

— Ez kérem már a módosított, új kiadású tankönyv... Épp most téptük ki belőle a nem odavaló lapokat!...

THE QUICKEST SOLUTION

—You will note that this is a revised edition, a newly published textbook. . . . We have just torn out the pages which don't belong there. . . .

—From *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), July 4, 1957.

revolution in Budapest, but hooligans released from the prisons and Fascist elements.[12]

When the party called for the restoration of the "honor" of the secret police (AVH), *Nepszabadsag* obligingly began a series of articles on this most despised element in Hungary called "Speaking of Heroes." And a Communist professor of law took on the difficult task of "proving" in five articles that "there is no government in the world today which could be more legal and constitutional than the Kadar government." [13]

Such travesties on fact have been accompanied by a high-pitched campaign against the bogey of revisionism. The pent-up torrent of ideas, turbulent, exhilarating, which not so long ago swept away the very foundations of the Communist regime, has vanished into an arid desert of neo-Stalinism. Cultural and ideological sterility prevails. While in the USSR there is at least some effort toward economic decentralization going on (whatever the political impetus and implications of the program), in Kadar's Hungary Marxist economists who hinted at the necessity for a major overhaul of the economy were labeled "revisionists." Arguments envisaging a "new economic pattern" put forward by such men as Tamas Nagy (a translator of Marx), Gyoergy Peter (director of the Central Statistical Bureau) and Peter Erdoes (director of the Economic Research Institute) were refuted by the assertion that their proposals did not take into account the role of the party and undermined the central direction of the socialist state. They were charged with a virtual revision of Marxism-Leninism by their blind following of the harmful Yugoslav example of workers' autonomy, "which caused such serious contradictions in the Yugoslav economy." [14]

The Offensive Against Art and Literature

Concurrently a hard battle has been waged in the world of art and literature against "bourgeois decadence, revisionist infection, harmful deviations." Promises, threats, intimidation, economic pressure and subtle persuasion have been mixed together in this campaign. At first the regime showed willingness to allow a certain amount of freedom in cultural matters; later it launched an all-out offensive in an effort to curb continuing resistance and to force some show of conformity from the intellectuals.

So far this effort has been in vain: the majority of writers and artists are still firmly, and even openly, opposed to the regime. Among the weapons left to them in this resistance, perhaps the most effective is simply refusal to produce. The party-controlled literary bimonthly *Elet es irodalom* has frequently bewailed "the deaf silence of our writers," and demanded a "thorough purge at the publishing houses, in the theater and film." [15] Recently it complained:

Eight months have passed and we have not yet achieved victories in our literary life. Our writers are silent, courteously declining the request of party periodicals for manuscripts.[16]

Theaters have been reprimanded for producing drama expressing and fostering nostalgia, instead of putting on plays expressing Soviet and "people's democratic" ideology. On May 29 *Magyarorszag* complained of the theatrical escape into the "bourgeois past" and asked the authorities to announce their displeasure; three weeks later five theater managers were dismissed.

The impact of Mao's recent, much-publicized pronouncements on cultural "freedom" hardly helped the Kadar crackdown on the intellectuals. While the press published the edited version of Mao Tse-tung's speech, the leaders tried to avoid its theoretical pitfalls and made it clear that they had no intention of transplanting Chinese flowers to Hungarian soil. Referring to the speech, Kadar stressed that "it is first of all applicable to China," and then pointed out the "importance

[12] Ferenc Czikesz, in *Nepszabadsag*, May 9, 1957.
[13] *Magyarorszag*, April 10, 1957.
[14] *Nepszabadsag*, June 23, 1957.
[15] *Elet es irodalom*, April 24 and July 5, 1957.
[16] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1957.

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of correct application." ("Correctly applied" by Kadar, Mao's theory could, of course, be used to justify continued oppression of Hungary's creative elements, so long as the regime first branded them "counterrevolutionaries.") *Elet es irodalom* (July 5) applied Mao's now-famous phrase in another way, in the course of lamenting the lack of a correct outlook among Hungary's film producers:

The Chinese slogan, 'let a hundred flowers bloom' has been turned inside out in our film production; in our films every flower is budding but the socialist one.

Party declarations have demonstrated particular bitterness against those whom the Communist regard as the "braintrust" of the revolution, the writers and journalists. But none of the pressures brought to bear have succeeded in smashing the boycott of silence with which the majority of these writing men have greeted regime efforts to induce their professional support. In an attempt to break down resistance, the regime dissolved the Writers' and Journalists' Union and created separate, closely-controlled Literary and Press Councils in its stead. When this failed to have any effect, the regime imprisoned approximately thirty writers and journalists, including such figures as the renowned novelist Tibor Dery, prize-winning poet Zoltan Zelk, and Gyula Hay, internationally known playwright. This regression to the revolting excesses of Stalinism can only be viewed as a bald admission by the Communists that they consider their system incompatible with intellectual and spiritual honesty.

The New Reign of Terror

The Kadar regime's resort to naked terrorism, to the brutal methods of Stalinist repression, is, of course, the most horrifying and outrageous aspect of its eleven-month reign. Its power revived, the secret police has taken vengeance for the taste of its own medicine it was forced to swallow last October. The cubicles of the Foeutca police prison, the barracks of the Kistarcsa and Recs camps, have been filled with so-called "counter-revolutionaries" from every layer of the population—respected scholars and patriotic youngsters, peasant leaders and courageous workers. The first victims of this new purge were higher-ranking Communists who had thrown their support to Nagy during the revolution, now labeled "traitors." Two-thirds of the arrested intellectuals, for example, were former party members. A typical case of their treatment at the Kadar regime's hands is that of Gabor Foeldes, the former chief director of the National Theater at Gyoer. A Communist for sixteen years, he led a group on October 23 under the banner, "Long Live the Party!" In April the party's literary organ reprimanded him for "blindness" but hailed the part he had played in hindering the summary execution of several AVH officers;[17] yet three months later Foeldes was sentenced to death on the charge that he had "organized" a massacre of AVH members.

Former Communists were soon joined in the prisons by the leaders of the revived non-Communist parties; these included Istvan Bibo, Minister of State in the Nagy government, and Laszlo Kardos and Attila Szigethy, respectively Catholic and Smallholder leaders. Among the population at large, a staggering number of arrests and imprisonments have taken place; according to reliable sources there have been at least 40,000 arrests and 20,000 internments. The regime has announced publicly the imposition of only 105 death sentences, but the real number has been estimated in the thousands.

While claiming "decisive victories" against the "opposition," the party continues to demand constant vigilance: "The battle is far from finished, for our enemies are trying to infiltrate into the party, state apparatus, mass organizations." [18] After the reshuffling of the top leadership in Moscow, the regime redoubled its warnings: "Revisionist circles will certainly try to utilize the Moscow resolutions for their own ends." [19] All summer long alleged plots have been "uncovered," "spies" unmasked, arrests made, threats issued. Hungary today has become a country of fear—almost everyone, it is reported, lives in apprehension that he may be arrested, executed, or at least suffer ruin at the hands of the Communists. The purge, the continuous wave of arrests, the show trials, perpetuate what a student of Soviet affairs has aptly called "stabilized instability."

Survival of a Proud Spirit

Despite this atmosphere of terror, the most striking fact emerging from reports leaking out of Hungary is the existence of a strong feeling of "underground solidarity" among the Hungarian people. In defiance of their fears, Hungarians individually and by groups have continued to show in diverse ways where their sentiments lie. *Nepszabadsag* has complained, for example, that hundreds of people "spring to the defense" of accused prisoners, attempting to organize "virtual saving actions." [20] When the AVH members of a summary

[17] *Ibid.*, April 12, 1957.
[18] *Ibid.*, June 29, 1957.
[19] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1957.
[20] Karoly Kiss, in *Nepszabadsag*, June 23, 1957.

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court voted down the judge and imposed the death sentence on two young writers, the judge resigned in protest. Budapest physicians openly collected 300,000 *forints* to help the relatives of political prisoners.

Such instances show that the *cri-de-coeur* of the Hungarian people will not be stifled by the regime's efforts to instill fear and suspicion. The manifest signs of passive resistance constitute as much a costly loss of face for communism in Hungary as did the October revolution itself.

In some respects, the Kadar regime has succeeded in creating a surface impression of recovery from the effects of October. There has been a feverish attempt to obliterate the visible scars of the uprising; in Budapest battered buildings have been repaired, and a great deal of new construction is going on. The crowds trailing through the streets are somewhat better dressed and better fed than they imagined they would be. But the general mood of a driven and exhausted people, denied the respite and the rewards they believed they had earned with their sacrifices in the revolution, is something the regime cannot camouflage.

The *enfant terrible* of Eastern Europe has realized at the cost of tremendous human sacrifice that barring future upheavals in the Soviet bloc her fate can ultimately be changed solely in the framework of a European settlement. Nevertheless, communism's ability to elicit any measure of popular support is forever dead in Hungary. No matter how tenacious the Communist ruling class proves to be, the final chapter of last October is yet to be written on the pages of Hungary's history.

Janos Kadar—A Profile

IN THE OFTEN oversimplified language of journalism, Janos Kadar, who has headed the Hungarian government since the abortive anti-Communist revolt of November 1956, is referred to as "Moscow puppet" or, more bluntly, as "traitor". Both epithets may be merited, but they hardly suffice to describe the character and motivations of the man who plays the unsavory role of Moscow's Quisling and proconsul in the "sovereign" Hungarian "People's Republic."

Before attempting to assess the man, a brief resume of the highlights of his career seems in order. A locksmith in his younger days, he moved toward communism via the Socialist-inspired young workers' movement, his participation in it earning him a two-and-a-half year prison term under the pre-World War II regime of Admiral Horthy. Then, during the 1944-45 interlude of Nazi puppet rule in Hungary, he distinguished himself in the anti-Nazi underground, serving as a trusted lieutenant of the leader of its Communist wing, Laszlo Rajk. His quality of unassuming simplicity appealed to workers like himself, and he had courage, cunning and a cool head.

After the war, thanks to the favor of Matyas Rakosi, the undisputed boss of Hungarian communism, Kadar won a place among the top five figures of the regime, becoming a deputy secretary general of the party and member of the Politburo. He was, however, regarded as less of an extremist than the out-and-out "Muscovites" like Rakosi, Ernoe Geroe, and Jozsef Revai, standing somewhere between this group and the homebred "red-white-and-green" Communists—so called from the Hungarian tricolor—like Rajk, Gula Kallai, and Sandor Zold.

In 1949 Kadar played a nefarious role as Rakosi's instrument in engineering the arrest and liquidation-by-trial of his own former chief, Rajk, on charges of Titoism. While Rajk was subjected to brutal physical tortures in the chambers of the AVH in order to break his will, Kadar's task was to add the subtler pressure of "persuasion". Rakosi counted upon Rajk's trust in Kadar, a trust attested to by the fact that he had made Kadar godfather of his son born shortly before his arrest. Kadar performed his mission well. Meeting Rajk in prison, he addressed him as "dear Laci" and calmly urged him to accept ignominy and a predetermined court sentence in the same breath that he acknowledged the party leaders' recognition of his com-

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plete innocence.[1] Rajk yielded and was sentenced to death.

Kadar earned his just reward for this service to Rakosi, when the latter ordered his arrest in 1951 on charges almost identical with those against Rajk: treason, espionage, and Titoism. These accusations were patently ludicrous: Rakosi's real motive undoubtedly was fear of Kadar's mounting popularity in the party, which he saw as a threat to the domination of the "Muscovites." There was no new show trial, however; Kadar was tried in secret court proceedings and not sentenced until December 1951, eight months after his arrest. The apparent explanation—a testimonial to his stubborn fortitude—was that, unlike Rajk, he was not broken by AVH tortures which included brutal beatings, the tearing out of some of his fingernails, and almost three years of solitary confinement.

Kadar gained his release at the hands of Imre Nagy a few months after Nagy first became premier, replacing Rakosi, in the initial post-Stalin changes of mid-1953. He became party secretary for the important 13th workers' district of Budapest but remained in the background until July 1956 when Rakosi's renewed domination of the party, undermined by the Twentieth CPSU Congress and its aftermath, finally crumpled.

Kadar had a major role in the overthrow of "Stalin's best Hungarian disciple." On July 16, 1956, the party Central Committee met in the presence of the Kremlin's emissary, Anastas Mikoyan. In order to curb the tide of revolutionary unrest already sweeping the land, Rakosi proposed the arrest of 400 writers and intellectuals, whereupon Kadar took the floor to tell the party First Secretary that the people and the party had stood all they could of his tyranny. The circumstances strongly suggested that Kadar's move and the Central Committee's prompt decision to oust Rakosi from the leadership had received a green-light signal from the Kremlin, communicated by Mikoyan.

During the three months preceding the October upheaval, Kadar moved with the cunning of a fox. He did not break openly with Geroe, the staunch Stalinist who had succeeded Rakosi as First Secretary of the party, and once again withdrew into the background while the new party leadership began bargaining with Nagy for the latter's return to the party. When the revolution swept Nagy back to power as premier, Kadar—who simultaneously replaced Geroe as head of the party—first joined and then betrayed the man to whom he owed his freedom.

The facts of this betrayal are now history. On October 30 Kadar declared his full support of Nagy's policies and agreed that Communist one-party rule should end; on November 1 he announced the dissolution of the existing (Communist) Workers' Party and the formation of a new party committed to "national independence" and "fraternal relations" with other socialist parties.[2] Then, on the night of November 1—the exact hour is not clearly established—he sneaked out of the Parliament building and went over to the Russians. On November 4, Soviet tanks smashed the revolt in Budapest and installed Kadar as head of a new puppet government which has since restored the monolithic, oppressive rule of prerevolutionary days.

SO MUCH FOR Kadar's record; what of the man himself? He certainly is not a Stalinist in the full, orthodox sense of that term, though he might be called a neo-Stalinist in that he is resorting to Stalinist methods and techniques of suppression. This resort merely seems to indicate that even those Communists who dislike the brutality of Stalin's era and who themselves were victims of it cannot avoid being compelled by the very logic and exigencies of their position and ideology to resort to similar methods.

Kadar's initial support of Nagy, no less than the Russians' early acquiescence in the latter's assumption of the premiership, was undoubtedly motivated by the calculation that he offered the best hope of preserving Communist rule. It seems clear, however, that this support ended as soon as Nagy came out for terminating the Communists' monopoly of power and that Kadar's declarations of October 30-November 1 were wholly insincere maneuvers to conceal his intention

[1] Kadar's conversation with Rajk was secretly recorded by order of Rakosi and was played back at the dramatic meeting of the Hungarian party Central Committee in July 1956, at which Rakosi was ousted from the leadership. Kadar's words were: "Dear Laci, I come to you on behalf of Comrade Rakosi. He requested me to come and explain the situation to you. Of course, we all know that you are innocent. But Comrade Rakosi believes that you will understand. Only really great comrades are chosen for such roles. He asked me to tell you that by doing this you will render historic service to the Communist movement." George Paloczi-Horvath in *The Times* (London), March 24, 1957.

[2] Kadar radio addresses to the nation, Budapest Radio Kossuth, October 30 and November 1, 1956. See English translations in *The Hungarian Revolution, A White Book,* ed. by Melvin J. Lasky, F. A. Praeger (New York), 1957. pp. 140, 179-81.

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of deserting to the Russians. It was well known in Budapest prior to the revolution that Kadar, despite his years in prison, feared and opposed any trend toward political "liberalization" because he knew that concessions along this line would ultimately end the party's monolithic rule. Most of the Communists in Nagy's entourage realized this, too, but they were prepared to accept such an outcome as the unavoidable, and even merited, consequence of past blunders. To Kadar such a compromise was unthinkable: he chose reliance upon Soviet force to preserve communism as the sole ruling power. The choice was deliberate despite all purely imaginary rumors that he was compelled by some sinister method to betray the revolution.

Nevertheless, certain facts seems to suggest that Kadar, even though his choice was deliberate, had some qualms about the rightness of his course for many months after November 4—and even now is not entirely free of them. This was evidenced by his attitude at the almost nightly meetings he held with representatives of the Budapest Workers' Council up to its dissolution in December. He talked openly with these men, who were industrial workers as he once had been. On one occasion he told them, "Bring back Nagy, bring him out from the Yugoslav Embassy, and I will gladly give him back this chair!" [3] He also declared on other occasions that the presence of Soviet troops "offends our national pride" and acknowledged that the revolution—contrary to the official claim of a reactionary conspiracy—had been a "mass movement" with noble aims.[4] There is reason to believe that Kadar meant these things when he said them, and that they bespoke genuine doubts and vacillation.

Kadar knew that he could not impress the workers by taking a haughty attitude. In his talks with the council delegates, he forgot himself only once to the point of demanding, "Whom do you think you represent?" He immediately backed down when his outburst drew the well-deserved retort, "All right, let's discuss whom we represent, Comrade Kadar. Let's begin with you. Whom do you think you represent?"

Kadar's greatest popularity prior to the revolution had been among the workers. Indeed, he was the only one of the ranking party leaders who enjoyed their confidence to any extent. They supported him

[3] Told by members of the Budapest Workers' Council delegation in an interview wtih Hungarian and foreign press representatives, and reported in Associated Press dispatch from Budapest, November 16, 1956.

[4] Reported in official party organ, *Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, December 31, 1956.

". . . We must strengthen and exercise the proletarian dictatorship . . ."

Kadar reaffirms the hard-line policies of his regime at the May session of the Hungarian Parliament, the first convened after the revolution.

because he had been one of them, because he was not a "Muscovite", and because he had suffered under Rakosi. Despite his betrayal of the revolution, some traces of this popularity still remained after November 4. The workers could not believe that a man from their own ranks would not think as they did. Their disillusionment is now complete.

If the workers were still willing for a time to listen to Kadar, the same was not true of other elements. Following his assumption of power, he hoped to cajole non-Communists into cooperating with him, but he was snubbed. He tried to patch up the breach with Nagy while the latter was still a refugee in the Yugoslav Embassy and was rebuffed. He attempted to make peace with the intellectuals, but they turned their backs on him. At the same time, he has had to cope with the opposition of the old-guard Stalinists, now led by the brilliant writer and longtime chief party theorist, Jozsef Revai. One of them sits at Kadar's right hand as deputy premier—the cunning Dr. Ferenc Muennich, who upbraided Kadar publicly for his qualms and hesitancy in dealing with the revolutionaries.

Kadar must also be far from easy over his relationship with Moscow. No satellite leader is a "free agent," but Kadar obviously is less free than most of his

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counterparts. He had to pledge complete subservience to the Kremlin's dictates because Soviet intervention was the only means of preserving Communist rule in Hungary. Now thoroughly dependent upon continued Moscow support, he must be harassed by the thought that the leaders in the Kremlin do not really trust him in view of his initial support of Nagy and can at any moment cut the thread holding the sword of Damocles above his head.

Why, then, did Moscow choose him? The probable answer is, in part, because it is an old Communist stratagem to use men who have compromised themselves, but primarily because there was no other party leader more acceptable to the Kremlin who could command any support whatever in Hungary; Kadar at least might have the support of the workers. There is still no better alternative; therefore Moscow keeps him, and his position has very probably been strengthened as a result of the recent purge of the last old-guard Stalinists in the Soviet leadership, Molotov and Kaganovich.

Even though Kadar has had recourse to many of the repressive methods of the old regime, it does not necessarily follow that he intends or desires a complete restoration of the prerevolutionary *status quo*. To put it bluntly, he will do what Moscow wants him to do, but the indications are that the Khrushchev leadership is at present less interested in the way the satellites solve their domestic problems—it continues to tolerate both rigid Stalinists in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and a "liberal" Communist like Gomulka in Poland—than it is in assuring that they remain securely within the Soviet empire.

Meanwhile, Kadar strives to cope with a host of domestic problems and to restore the shattered prestige of the party. Whatever he may do in the future, however, his name is already indelibly inscribed in the history books along with those of Quisling and Laval.

E. M.

Caption under circular insert: July 1957
—Congratulations on your promotion.
—Thanks; you see, I knew my place in October.
Caption, right: October 1956.
—He knew his place . . . (Man is emerging from toilet).

—From *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), July 11, 1957.

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The AVH: Symbol of Terror

By Paul Ignotus

IN HUNGARY, as in most of the East European countries occupied by Soviet troops in 1944-45, "liberation" from the Nazis was followed by an interim period during which the new Soviet overlords temporarily respected, for the most part, their promises to restore democratic rule. The forms of parliamentary democracy were re-established, relatively free elections were permitted, and the Communists shared ministerial and other state posts with representatives of the democratic parties, as yet independent of Communist manipulation. There was, however, one vital exception: in all the satellites, the Soviet occupiers created and reserved for exclusive control by hand-picked local Communists the key instrument for eventual seizure of total power: the security or political police. None of these satellite organizations became a more hated symbol and ruthless practitioner of terror than the Hungarian AVH.

The original nucleus of the Hungarian organization was set up in December 1944 by special units of the Soviet NKVD accompanying the occupation forces. To head it they chose the notorious Gabor Peter, a one-time tailor's apprentice who had become chief of the "security department" of the Hungarian Communist Party during its period of underground activity. Short and thickset, with a heavy moustache and large, glittering black eyes, Peter was a man filled with lust for power. As underground security chief, his task had been to divert the attention of the "white" police from Communist activities, a mission which he accomplished mainly by informing on fellow party members suspected of Trotskyite or other heretical leanings. This gave rise, at the time of his downfall, to accusations that he had been a double agent, but it is equally plausible that he chose this means of diversion because it served the added purpose of streamlining the party according to Stalinist precepts. In either case, the fact remains that he began victimizing his own comrades even before the Soviet conquest of Hungary.

Mr. Ignotus is a distinguished liberal writer who left Horthyite Hungary in 1939 to pursue his career in England. After several years at BBC and as a free-lance journalist, he joined the Hungarian Legation in London in 1947 and returned to Hungary in 1949. There he was arrested by the AVH and remained a political prisioner until March 1956. During the Hungarian revolution he escaped once more to England, and is currently writing a book of recollections to be published in 1958.

The AVO and Kat-Pol

The name and official status of the new organization changed several times before the end of 1945 when it was consolidated as an autonomous branch of the national police and placed under the nominal control of the Minister of the Interior. As its head, Peter was given the rank of Lieutenant General, and the official designation became *Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly* (State Security Department), commonly abbreviated to AVO. From force of habit most Hungarians still refer to it as the AVO although, with a new organizational change in 1949, its title was modified to *Allam-Vedelmi Hatosag* (State Security Authority), or AVH.

Peter's newly-recruited organization set up its headquarters in what had once been a rather fashionable apartment building at No. 60 Andrassy *ut.*, in the central part of Budapest. The choice was fitting for the structure had served after the late 1930's as the headquarters of the Hungarian Nazi Arrow-Cross Party: during the party's ascendancy many Jews and anti-Nazis had been tortured to death in its rooms and cellars. Now the Communists used it for meting out similar treatment to their own enemies. As the AVO's power and activities expanded, the 60 Andrassy *ut.* headquarters spilled over into one after another of the surrounding buildings until, by 1949, it had become a virtual citadel within the

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city, a sprawling House of Horrors avoided with a shudder by the populace.

While the NKVD created its counterpart in the AVO, the Soviet Kommandatura set up a parallel agency, the *Katona-Politikai* or military-political police, generally known as *Kat-Pol*. There was no clear division between their respective spheres of activity: although the AVO theoretically dealt with civilians and *Kat-Pol* with soldiers, actually both arrested either. Also, *Kat-Pol* supposedly was an instrument of "offensive" intelligence while the AVO's function was "defensive" counter-intelligence, but both organizations operated simultaneously in either area—arresting spies and conducting their own espionage operations abroad. The only real difference was that they served different masters within one Soviet oligarchy.

The man chosen by the Russians to head *Kat-Pol* was Major-General Gyoergy Palffy-Oesterreicher, an intelligent and intensely ambitious man of upper middle-class origin, who had formerly been a professional officer in the Hungarian Army during Horthy's rule. His methods of dealing with non-Communists were no more humane than Peter's, but they were more discriminatingly and professionally applied. *Kat-Pol* at least made a serious effort to sift and evaluate the information gathered by it, and its personnel was correspondingly more carefully selected, including a number of ex-army officers of the *ancien regime*.

From AVO to AVH

In the first year or two of its existence, the AVO focussed its activities largely on ferreting out and punishing the worst Nazi criminals. After that, however, it became increasingly a tool of the "Muscovite" dictator of the party, Matyas Rakosi, in applying his so-called "salami tactics" of dividing and persecuting the leaders of the non-Communist democratic and social democratic groups sharing power with the Communists.[1] More and more of the victims of AVO persecution were persons identified with these groups, whose sole offense was that they stood in the way of Rakosi's goal of establishing a full party dictatorship.

In official Communist jargon, 1948 was the "year of the turning point." Hungary was proclaimed a "People's Republic", euphemistically defined as a state "performing the task of a proletarian dictatorship without the Soviet form." The meaning of this new status was starkly underlined by the great "show trials" of Cardinal Mindszenty and Laszlo Rajk in 1949, which heralded the start of wholesale "liquidations" not only of the already silenced non-Communist political opposition but also of Communists suspected of Titoist or other "deviationist" tendencies. The trial and execution of Rajk as a Hungarian Tito was, of course, a dutiful response to the hysterical demands of Stalin, but the decision to make Rajk the leading victim was largely that of Rakosi, who feared him as the highest-ranking non-Muscovite party official and therefore potential rival.

Rakosi's move against Rajk afforded Peter and the AVO both an opportunity and an inducement to pay off old scores, to liquidate personal enemies and competitors, and to build up the AVO as a state within—and even above—the state. Peter himself undoubtedly disliked Rajk, who as Minister of Interior had exercised his right to summon Peter occasionally to report on AVO activities. He had more cause, however, to hate Rajk's legal adviser in the ministry, Endre Szebeni, who had advocated a reduction of the huge operating expenses of the AVO. And he also hated Palffy-Oesterreicher, the head of *Kat-Pol*, as a personal rival. In preparing the case against Rajk, the AVO also fabricated charges against these two men, and they and a number of other Communist security officials were tried and hung along with Rajk in the fall of 1949 either as Yugoslav and American "spies" or as "stool-pigeons of the Horthy-Fascist police." Many of their subordinates and friends were thrown into prison.

The AVO's reward was a new reorganization which made it the sole political police authority with control of all armed forces charged with "safeguarding the workers' power." The scope of its activities was also enlarged to embrace direct control of certain prisons and also of the frontier guard units, whose members became known as the "Green AVO" from the distinguishing green lapels of their uniforms. Most important of all, the reorganization freed the AVO of responsibility to any government ministry and made it subject only to orders from a "Council of State Security" of four or five persons headed by Rakosi. This change was reflected in the official redesignation of the organization as the State Security Authority (AVH).

The peak years of AVH power and activity were 1950-52, during which it executed, imprisoned or subjected to varying degrees of sadistic brutality tens of thousands of victims, not to mention a vastly larger number deported to slave labor camps outside Hungary.

[1] For a detailed analysis of these tactics, see article entitled "Matyas Rakosi on Bolshevist Strategy and Tactics," *Problems of Communism* No. 4, 1952, pp. 28-36.

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The victims included men and women from all social strata, every walk of life, and all political groups: clergymen, army officers, former civil servants, shopkeepers, industrialists—all those considered "exploiters"; and later, to an increasing extent, peasants labelled as "kulaks," workers accused as "saboteurs," leftist intellectuals branded as "cosmopolitan conspirators," and trade unionists alleged to be "traitors to the working class."

In this period the AVH was, indeed, a state within the state, wielding such vast power that it could conspire with impunity against all but the party's top "Muscovite" leaders. Its high officers were second only to this small inner party circle as members of the most privileged caste of the "People's Democracy." Even its simple corporals, whenever they appeared in public wearing the familiar hated uniform of the AVH, took precedence over any ordinary citizen.

But while the fearful power of the AVH and much of its past record of atrocities are now common knowledge, relatively little has been written about its make-up, inner workings, and the psychological attitudes inculcated in its personnel. These obviously are areas where official documentation from Communist sources is not available. The information offered here derives from the author's own observations and direct contacts with AVH personnel during almost seven years as their prisoner.

The Practitioners of Terror

The men who composed the AVH were a strange mixture. Its top-level personnel were generally of middle-class or petit-bourgeois origin. Not a few, including Peter and one of his two deputy chiefs, Colonel Ernoe Szuecs, were of Jewish extraction. The other deputy chief, Colonel Gyula Decsy, stemmed from the trans-Danubian German minority and had been on the verge of ordainment as a Catholic priest when he suddenly turned Communist.

The subordinate officers and the rank and file were recruited mainly from the rabble or what Marxists term the "Lumpenproletariat." The presence among them of a conspicuously large proportion of ex-followers of the Nazi Arrow-Cross was less surprising than it might seem, for in 1945-46 the Communists had openly welcomed into the party the so-called "little Arrow-Cross people"—proletarians and poor peasants whose true revolutionary feelings, the party claimed, had merely been temporarily distorted through Nazi propaganda. These late converts to communism unquestionably made good material for the AVH to draw upon since their compromised political records provided a sure guarantee of zealousness in the performance of their duties.[2]

Characteristic of the depraved types who found a congenial career in the AVH was Captain, later Lieutenant-Colonel, Gyula Princz. Originally a coal-man, he had joined the Arrow-Cross, though his superiors claimed that he had done so as a secret Communist agent. He was a stout young man with the flabby, dissolute face of the habitual drunkard, and when I first encountered him in the cellars of No. 60 Andrassy after my arrest, he was serving as chief of the "beating-up section". In that capacity he was directly responsible for the death-by-torture of many prisoners. Yet, when he himself wound up in prison after the downfall and arrest of Peter in 1952, the official charges of which he was found guilty were merely graft and racketeering.

The Rewards—Legal and Illegal

The size of the AVH has always been kept officially secret, but it probably reached about 80,000 in the peak period.[3] The regime has also never divulged the amount of public funds placed at the AVH's disposal, and it is impossible even to estimate it from such known data as the standard pay scale since actual salaries depended not on rank but the nature of the duty. In principle, AVH officers and noncommissioned offcers received the same pay as those in the Army or the regular police, plus a regular bonus to compensate for the "dangerous" nature of their service. In fact, however, the pips on an AVH man's uniform were no indication of either his pay or his real authority. A lieutenant, for instance, might command a unit in which captains served as subordinates, the lieutenant receiving higher pay; sergeants often took orders from, and were paid less than, corporals. The real aristocracy of the AVH in respect of pay was its "Operative Group" whose task was to check up on AVH personnel just as the AVH in turn exercised surveillance over all citizens.

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[2] Some of the jailers I encountered during my imprisonment were known to have been Arrow-Cross members. I remarked about this several times to high-ranking AVH officers, and they never denied it. Typical of their attitude was the answer I received from one lieutenant colonel, who said, "Never mind, the *Nyilas* [Arrow-Cross members] are not dangerous today. It is the Social Democrats and Titoists who are the real dangers."

[3] The figure of 80,000 represents a conservative estimate made by former Communists at one time connected with the Hungarian Ministry of Justice.

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On the average, however, the monthly salary of an AVH second lieutenant or NCO may be conservatively estimated as 5,000 forints, compared to 900-1100 for the average skilled worker and 600 for unskilled workers (11.6 forints=$1.00 at the official rate). The average AVH colonel received 8,000-10,000 forints per month. These salaries were augmented by the officially-sanctioned distribution among AVH personnel of the confiscated property of detainees, or of the proceeds from its sale. Such property included not only clothing, jewelry and furniture, but even houses and apartments. The sale of goods produced by convict labor in the prison workshops and factories under AVH control was another authorized source of revenue. Most of it went into the coffers of the AVH as a whole, or was allocated to its special economic branch (KOMI), but it was common practice for workshop or factory foremen—often mere sergeants—to withhold a part of the output for sale on the blackmarket to swell their own personal incomes. Individual AVH officials also lined their pockets through the illegal sale of passports.

Which of these practices were legally sanctioned and which were pure graft was largely academic inasmuch as the policy of the regime was not to interfere with personal racketeering among AVH personnel. The important thing from the regime's standpoint was to assure that, as the "fist of the proletarian dictatorship," they remain contented and thoroughly loyal. Within the AVH itself, the top officials took a similar attitude with regard to graft and embezzlement by their subordinates, except that here illegal practices were not merely tolerated, but even encouraged. The explanation is simple: those at the top could make the crimes of a subordinate the formal grounds for trying and jailing him whenever, for any reason, they wished to get rid of him. The fate of Gyula Princz was a case in point.

"Truth"—AVH Style

Racketeers and thugs that they were, the officers of the AVH nevertheless seemed to regard their profession in somewhat of a romantic light. They viewed the world as ruled by rival espionage and counter-espionage services, and when they referred to their counterparts in the French "Deuxième Bureau" or the British "I.S.," they did so in terms which betrayed not only the pride of the initiated but scarcely-concealed awe. They were taught to be intensely proud of their calling and to look upon it as the most important activity in the world. Their hero was Dzerzhinsky, the first head of the Soviet secret police, whom they regarded as second only to Stalin among the great men of history. His picture decorated the walls of nearly every office in AVH headquarters.

One of the most staggering things driven home to me by my own experience as an AVH prisoner was the realization that my interrogators were not interested in the truth by any accepted definition of the term. That justice should be of slight concern to an organization required to place the security of the Communist regime above all else was understandable. But if, indeed, the safety of the regime was its paramount objective, this very fact should have dictated strenuous efforts to ascertain the real truth with respect to who was a loyal Communist, and who was not. In reality, the truth mattered little. Even more than the safeguarding of the Communist system, the task of the AVH was to assure the continued domination of the party by its Stalinist leadership, and to fabricate whatever "factual" evidence was necessary to destroy those regarded by the leadership as its real or potential enemies.

The manufacture of outright lies, elevated to the status of "truth" through forced or forged confessions, was rationalized by AVH inquisitors by means of various formulae. One of these sought to distinguish between ordinary "factual truth" and "political truth," with the latter of course taking precedence. The practical effect of this formula was that the moment anyone was placed on the regime's list of political suspects, the crime of which he was suspected became a "political truth" justifying the invention of any facts needed to prove it.

The devious and brutal techniques used by the AVH to obtain these "facts" are well known and have been described in detail by myself and other ex-prisoners in published articles.[4] Suffice it to say that besides the various physical tortures, some too horrible to describe, there were the subtler methods of working on the mind, deprivation of sleep, and so on. Most of the victims, unable to "spill" any genuine information of the kind demanded by their inquisitors, were compelled in the end either to invent false confessions of their own or to sign their names to whatever statements the AVH invented for them. Promises of the finest recuperative care in a sanatorium and of early release after trial were often held out as inducements to sign such statements, but the promises were rarely kept. In making these offers, AVH officials openly boasted that the trial judges

[4] See for example, the author's articles in the Paris weekly *Demain*, January 10 and January 17, 1957, under the title, "Comment Nous Avons Avoué" (How We Confessed).

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were their puppets and would impose whatever sentence the AVH ordered them to. My own interrogator, for instance, told me before my trial what sentences my co-defendants and I would get.

TWO FACTS had been responsible for my arrest upon returning to Hungary in September 1949: first, I was a Social Democrat; second, I had spent the preceding ten years in England, originally as a political refugee from the Horthy regime.[5] This combination of suspect political leanings and the wide connections I had built up in England as a journalist was woven by the AVH into fanciful charges of espionage on which I was finally tried in November 1950 and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

The very fact that, besides being a Social Democrat, I had been out of Hungary for ten years should have satisfied my inquisitors that I could not have had any close contacts with Communists of the post-war Hungarian regime. Nevertheless, about 60 or 70 percent of the interrogations I underwent concerned Hungarian party members about whom the AVH was evidently trying to obtain "compromising" information. I was asked in 1950, for example, to repeat every bit of gossip that I had heard in England with regard to individual Hungarian Communists. What was specifically sought, however, was gossip indicating that some of them were regarded by the British as potential Titoists.

When I denied hearing anything of this kind, my interrogator insisted that, as a journalist, I must have heard some gossip. Forced to give some reply, I decided upon one that would harm no one.

"Well then," I answered, "I must say that I heard such gossip mainly about Matyas Rakosi. Some British people, including journalists of Conservative political outlook, used to refer to him as a 'moderate' who might very well dislike what he was being forced to do under orders from the Kremlin."

It was, indeed, true that Rakosi had posed right after the war as a moderate and nationalist-minded Communist, a guise which had successfully deluded many conservatives, liberals and socialists in Britain as well as in Hungary. But the interrogator waved aside my reply with a disapproving gesture.

"That's of no interest, of course," he told me. "Don't bother to tell such things about serious men."

I then asked whom I was to consider as falling in the category of "serious men." He named five: Rakosi; the second-ranking party leader, Ernoe Geroe; General Mihaly Farkas, No. 3 "Muscovite" and then Minister of National Defense; Janos Kadar, then Minister of Interior; and the head of the AVH, Gabor Peter.

"So you want gossip about all the rest?" I asked.

"Yes," he replied, "about all the rest."

I finally drew up a statement according to these specifications. It consisted largely of fabrications deliberately intended to blacken the reputations of Communists who were known to be the wiliest and most fanatical Stalinists. But this effort, too, was of no avail. The ones I tried to discredit were not on the AVH blacklist, and the "information" was tossed aside as of no interest.

Bulwark of Dictatorship

Although the only "facts" of interest to the AVH were those which, genuine or manufactured, served to incriminate its own enemies or those of the party's Stalinist bosses, its information-gathering network and machinery of political surveillance over the population at large were imposing. Both the AVH and the control organs of the party operated in these areas, supplementing each other's activities. Between the files of the AVH and those kept by party offices throughout the country, dossiers known as "cadre-cards" were maintained for all citizens, recording every scrap of compromising information supplied by regular AVH or party agents or by voluntary informants. Apartment house superintendents were regularly required to furnish detailed reports on the private lives and utterances of the residents. Schoolchildren were encouraged to spy on their parents, and wives on their husbands.

During the October 1956 revolt, some of these files, including those kept in the central AVH headquarters, were seized by the insurgents and destroyed. But in most cases it was not the information entered on the "cadre-cards" which decided one's fate. For one thing, the information itself was necessarily sketchy, muddled, and often contradictory. More important, the personal jealousies, ambitions and enmities of AVH and party officials played a greater part in motivating action against particular individuals than the compromising data contained in their dossiers. Once a victim had been decided, the "cadre-cards" might occasionally be useful in building up the case against him, but the "factual" evidence needed could always be manufactured by the techniques and methods already described.

[5] At the time of my return, I did not anticipate arrest as I had been serving since 1947 as Press Attaché and Counsellor of the Hungarian Legation in London.

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The underlying purpose of the AVH in all these activities was to bolster its own power and influence by convincing the party leadership that the AVH was the sole reliable safeguard of the leadership's domination of both party and state. At the same time, it sought to prove to the NKVD that it was equally indispensable as a bulwark of Soviet power in Hungary. Co-operation between the AVH and NKVD agents in Hungary was close and unconcealed. The NKVD had its own special offices in Budapest, as well as villas for its personnel on the hillsides of Buda and in the country. Prisoners who the AVH thought might know something of direct interest to the Russians were, either before or after trial, sent over to the NKVD offices for interrogation. The treatment they received there was generally better than they experienced in the hands of the AVH.

Peter's Downfall and the "Thaw"

In 1951 there was a new wave of political terror in Hungary as Rakosi, with the eager collaboration of Peter's AVH, moved to liquidate remaining elements in the party accused of "Rajkism." Janos Kadar, who in 1949 had actively assisted Rakosi in destroying Rajk and had been on the AVH list of "serious men," was thrown into prison himself along with other alleged "nationalist deviators."

The purge of Kadar, then Minister of Interior, enabled Peter to engineer the appointment to that post of a man whom he thought would act as his puppet: Dr. Zoeldi, formerly connected with a fascist youth organization. Zoeldi, however, proved less pliable than Peter had expected, and the latter began planning his arrest. In the end, this was unnecessary, for Zoeldi got wind of the plan and committed suicide after killing the members of his family.

Peter was equally ruthless in dealing with his own deputies. He turned against Colonel Szuecs, a veteran prewar Communist who had once shared a prison cell with Rakosi, and accused him of having acted as a British spy. Szuecs was arrested and beaten to death in the cellars of No. 60 Andrassy *ut*. Peter's other deputy, Colonel Decsy, became Minister of Justice and, in this capacity, evidently refused to comply with Peter's orders. A bitter war of intrigue followed, in which Peter and Decsy both denounced each other to Rakosi and the NKVD. Rakosi meanwhile learned that Peter had written a letter to Lavrenti Beria, the head of the NKVD, criticizing some of the allegations made by Rakosi in connection with Kadar's imprisonment.

This act of conspiracy directed at Rakosi himself proved Peter's undoing. Rakosi ordered Peter to go on leave and, in his absence, directed the AVH to prepare a case against him as well as Decsy as members of a "Zionist cosmopolitan conspiracy." By the end of 1952, both men had been imprisoned on these charges, and shortly thereafter a number of Peter's trusted subordinates in the AVH were also tried and jailed. It was not the eclipse of the man whose name had become symbolic of AVH terror, however, that marked the start of its decline. This had to await the political "thaw" which spread to the satellites soon after the death of Stalin.

In Hungary, the prelude to a move away from Stalinism was Rakosi's relinquishment of the premiership to Imre Nagy in July 1953, though Rakosi remained top party leader. It became obvious that sooner or later the new regime would have to take action to curb the arbitrary power of the AVH, to correct some of its past "mistakes," and to "re-establish socialist legality." During his tenure, Nagy succeeded in effecting some measure of reform: corporal punishment of prisoners was, at least officially, stopped; prisoners were allowed to communicate with their relatives; and some of the prison sentences that had been imposed during Peter's regime were subjected to review, resulting in the release of Kadar and others.

Though Rakosi was as culpable as Peter, he defended himself by taking the line that sole responsibility for the fake trials and other "mistakes," including the vilification of the "Yugoslav comrades," rested with "Gabor Peter and his gang." The charges of a "Zionist cosmopolitan conspiracy" which had served as the pretext for the imprisonment of Peter and his associates now became suddenly transformed into charges of "sectarianism" and "left-wing deviationism." Peter thus was given the scapegoat role of a Hungarian Beria.

Despite the fall of Nagy and the resurgence of Rakosi's power in 1955, the continuation and extension of the Soviet political "thaw" under Khrushchev, particularly after the outright repudiation of Stalinist crimes at the Twentieth CPSU Congress, brought further pressure on Hungary to curb the AVH. General Mihaly Farkas, his son Vladimir, an AVH colonel, and others who had played conspicuous parts in the terroristic excesses of the AVH were arrested during 1956 and joined Peter and Decsy in prison. Thus, by the outbreak of the October revolution, many of the worst AVH criminals had been removed and punished, and some important positions in the organization had been filled with new appointees who formerly had been

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imprisoned as "Rajkists." These changes, however, affected neither the basic character of the AVH nor the bulk of its personnel. It was the instinctive action of AVH guards in firing on unarmed crowds which turned an initially peaceful political demonstration into the revolutionary holocaust of October-November.

* * *

IN ITS HEYDAY under Peter, the AVH had become all but omnipotent in Hungary. With Rakosi's blessing, it had turned the country into one vast prison ruled by terror and sadism. Its members, using manufactured "truth" to justify their actions, tortured and executed thousands of innocent Hungarians, many of them loyal believers in the ideology which the AVH professed to uphold. But the terror which it inflicted on the nation, in the end, afflicted it, too. AVH officials came to live in constant fear of betrayal by one another, and many sought escape in suicide.

To what extent the AVH, abolished by the short-lived insurrectionary government of Imre Nagy, has experienced a revival of its authority under the post-revolutionary regime of Janos Kadar lies beyond the scope of the present article. There is good reason to believe that Kadar, as a former victim of its ruthlessness, can hardly be eager to restore the AVH to the position of arbitrary power which it held previously; yet it is evident that his regime has relied heavily on police repression to re-establish the monolithic rule of the party. This constitutes but another evidence that the evils typified by the AVH in its days of power are inescapable in a Communist state forced to rely for its preservation on a political police not subject to democratic controls.

COMMUNIST SOPHISTRY

The will of the people and the interests of the people are not always identical. It is the duty of the Communists not to let themselves be carried away by emotions that run counter to the interests of the people. Let them be confident that the people will ultimately recognize and uphold them.

In October and November many people lost their political orientation because they were temporarily deprived of their guide, the party. It is true that many would have taken up arms for the socialist order if arms had been handed to them, but the broad masses stared at these goings-on in a sort of stupor or despair, and some of the people—the people and not the hoodlums—actually turned against their own interests. Why? Because they were beguiled, because the political adventurers knew how to speak "in the name of the people, in the name of the revolution," and they played the part of socialists for quite a while.

The will of the people formed in this manner was the temporary will of a mere portion of the misguided people; for those October and November days were only a few weeks, a fleeting moment in the history of the nation. . . .

The answer to the question as to whether the people want socialism will be decided by the people who are not affected by madness.

—From an article entitled "Against the Will of the People?" by Jeno Szanto in Nepszabadsag (Budapest), June 1, 1957.

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Poland—A Political Glimpse

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

With undisguised pride a leading Polish intellectual recently remarked to this writer: "Poland today is the umbilical cord of world communism." This sense of the historical importance of Poland's present course, reminiscent of the attitude of the Yugoslavs a few years ago, characterized the prevailing atmosphere among the Marxists with whom the writer talked on a recent visit to Poland. They are men shocked to the core by twelve years of Soviet domination and deeply conscious of the un-Marxist character of the Stalinist stamp imprinted on international communism. Perhaps most striking is the curious sense of Messianism—so typical of Polish political thought since at least Mickiewicz—with which those Polish intellectuals who consider themselves Marxists approach the major issues facing the Communist camp today. Feeling very strongly that the USSR under Stalin constructed a system which negates the fundamental aspirations of Marxism, they view themselves as the vanguard of a new revolutionary reawakening—a Reformation, one might say, among Marxist ranks which will restore to Marxism its sense of humanism and its alleged scientific, non-dogmatic orientation. In fact, one Communist intellectual went so far as to declare that Marxism's main contribution was to establish the socially positive character of revolution and that it was now the duty of Marxists to rekindle the spirit of revolution among Communists, a spirit which will not take any existing "socialist" institutions or systems for granted but which will aim at maintaining the dialectic of revolution in historical motion.

Polish Marxism Today

The Chinese and Yugoslav experiments were understandably viewed with great interest by the Marxists with whom the writer talked. Mao Tse-tung's speech of last February was frequently quoted and his famous remark on "the hundred flowers" had become almost a part of daily speech. Nonetheless, one could not avoid the feeling that both the Chinese and the Yugoslav situations are not understood too clearly in Poland, that the specific conditions of the countries involved are ignored, and that the implications drawn from Mao's or Tito's positions are specially adapted to suit the altogether different conditions in Poland. Thus Mao's statements are used against the USSR to a far greater extent than Mao likely expected or possibly intended. Similarly Tito's claims of internal democracy through workers' management, while cited frequently in Poland, cannot overcome the fact that the area of personal freedom is already much greater in Warsaw than in Belgrade and that few Poles would put up with the situation if the Yugoslav system were really to be imitated. Nonetheless, both the Chinese and the Yugoslav systems afford the Poles much needed ammunition against any reversion toward Soviet domination and serve as proof that communism can maintain itself in power without duplicating Soviet methods.

Polish Marxists, today, however, are not a homogeneous group. While categorizing cross-currents of present opinion and debate involves some oversimplification, it is possible to discern three main though frequently overlapping groups: the "scientists", the "humanists", and the *"apparatchiki"*. The first is comprised primarily of Marxists who are scholars by pro-

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An educator at Harvard University and associate of the Russian Research Center there, Mr. Brzezinski spent the months of June and July in Poland, a follow-up to a tour in the USSR several months ago. Among his writings are *The Permanent Purge—Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* and *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, the latter co-authored with Carl J. Friedrich (both Harvard University Press, 1956); these volumes are discussed in Donald W. Treadgold's essay on p. 37 of this issue.

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fession. This group, rather small in numbers, feels strongly that Marxism must be restored as a social science and its scientific character must be cleansed of the legacy of dogmatism, so characteristic of Soviet communism even today. In this task they are even prepared to employ tools of analysis borrowed from western sociology, economics, political and behavioral sciences. They are confident that Marxism, restored as a science, will prevail in the long run because of its allegedly inherent superiority as a method of analysis over other western schools of thought.

The "humanists" are most numerous among Poland's intellectuals, particularly the writers. They claim that Marxism is essentially a quest for social justice and that the Soviet experiment lost sight of the fundamentally humanist objectives of Marx. Communism must therefore, above all else, seek to regain its predominantly humanitarian spirit and give up building a happy future over the graves of its victims. They, like the "scientists", hold that Soviet Marxism became too "institutional-minded" to the extent that it came to represent dogmatic political action (à la Stalin), and that sheer pragmatism is not necessarily un-Marxist. In fact, some claim that those social experiments which work and are liked by the people are *by definition* Marxist. Gomulka's pronouncements, incidentally, seem to reflect a curious mixture of these two orientations.

The third group, the *"apparatchiki"*, possibly do not deserve the appellation of "Marxist". It is composed simply of office holders who fear that the other two groups will undermine their position, alienate the USSR and cause an upheaval with disastrous consequences not only for Poland (which the above group certainly do not wish) but also for the *"apparatchiki"* personally. Town and village party secretaries, lower echelons of the Central Committee and some provincial committees are the sources from which the majority of the *"apparatchiki"* are recruited.

NOTWITHSTANDING the importance of this debate and the attention it has received in the world press, the visitor to Poland cannot escape the feeling that Marxism is on the whole discredited, certainly among the masses and even among the majority of the intellectuals. There seems to be a widespread feeling that the prosperity of the West is linked with its free enterprise system and that the solution to Poland's ills lies, apart from foreign credit, in widening the sphere of private initiative. (In fact, in Warsaw it seems to be a matter of social distinction to be identified as a person engaging in *"prywatna inicjatywa"*—that is, a person who makes a good living by personal ability, as *vs.* one who merely ekes out a livelihood as a bureaucrat). Somewhat inconsistently but probably wisely, given the country's economic conditions, most Poles seem to feel that even if they were to enjoy complete freedom of economic choice, a large measure of state ownership ought to be maintained—certainly, at any rate, in the newly-developed heavy industrial and communications sectors. However, the concept of a completely socialized economy with a minimum of private enterprise, like that in the USSR, is almost universally rejected—by the economists debating it, by the vast majority of Marxist intellectuals and by the masses as a whole. Indeed, most Marxists agree that the Gomulka regime's concessions to private enterprise (in retail trade, handicrafts, farming, *etc.*) are, generally speaking, not a mere NEP but a lasting aspect of future Polish socialism. As to what exactly constitutes the Polish path to socialism and socialism as an ultimate system, no one is very clear; these remain rather

rys. Z. Ziomecki
On najbardziej lubi książki fantastyczne...

Caption on book: "Materialism"
Caption below: He likes fantasies best . . .

—From *Magazyn Polski* (Warsaw), March 1957.

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vague and nebulous formulations. But everyone knows what socialism is *not*—particularly, that it is not what Stalin created.

Is Poland Totalitarian?

As a recent visitor to the USSR and one who has been long interested theoretically and practically in the meaning of totalitarianism, the present writer could not help being struck by certain features of the Polish scene: the extent of free speech both in private conversation and even to some measure in public statements of the press and radio; the sharpness of political plays, which spare neither the Polish Communists nor the USSR; the vitality of the Church; the complete absence of political slogans, red flags or stars. The question immediately arises whether a society which has loosened the bonds of regime control to this extent can be classified as a totalitarian system. The answer, of course, depends to some extent on definition.

If totalitarianism means, as this writer is inclined to feel,[1] a political system in which large-scale social revolution is being forcibly and most often brutally effected by an elite movement on the basis of certain doctrinaire assumptions, then the answer must be an unequivocal "no". The essential ingredients of modern totalitarian regimes are absent in today's Poland. The dogma—the official ideology—has completely disintegrated under repeated onslaughts from the reawakened intellectuals, from disillusioned youth, from minds finally freed from the silence of fear. Common sense, experimentation and pragmatism are taking its place. Revolutionary changes which in a Communist society have meant the destruction of the middle class, forced collectivization and rapid industrialization have given way to limited opportunities for private initiative, to the disbanding of over 80 percent of the collectives, and to a reassessment of the Five-Year Plan. The usual tool of "forcibly" effecting such changes, the secret police, has been neutralized and numerous of its members dismissed (many reportedly cannot find jobs) while the elite movement, in this case the United Polish Workers' Party, is in a state of widespread decay. Conversations with the rank-and-file leave an unmistakable feeling that the party locals are disoriented, embarrassed by revelations of past brutality, fearful of the future, and even largely in sympathy with the sentiments of the masses. (In one village which I visited the members of the party cell had been seeking "ideological" guidance from the village teacher, a member of the Peasant Party!).

[1] See my "Toltalitarianism and Rationality," *The American Political Science Review*, September 1956.

Even the top level of the party does not maintain the monolithic facade so characteristic of totalitarian regimes. It is common knowledge in Poland that Gomulka, in his own Politburo, steers between those who wish to "democratize" the system further and the so-called Zambrowski clique, who represent the *"apparatchiki"* in the party counsels and on whom Gomulka must rely for transmission of his directives. They are thus in a position to impede those measures which seem to them to be too liberal. Outside the effective leadership is the Natolin faction (although it disclaims the label of "fraction"), which in its turn is hardly a homogenous group. It has its own more "moderate" wing, under Nowak, which would acknowledge Soviet primacy in "the camp of socialism", restrict much of the personal freedom now existing in Poland and engage in inflationary economic policies to gain favor with the masses. The more extreme wing under Mijal and Mazur (an alleged agent of the MVD) would go much further: in addition to Nowak's program, it favors reinstituting forcible collectivization, restricting the Episcopate and eliminating religious instruction, possibly interning some of the leading intellectuals and certainly intensifying the "class struggle"—in short, re-establishing the reign of the secret police. Needless to add, the whole of this program would necessitate active Soviet support, as it would doubtless lead to large-scale violence. However, in recent months these extremists gradually have been losing ground, as evidenced by the Ninth Plenum and the Warsaw Party Conference.[2]

The Politics of Survival

From all of this it should be apparent that to characterize Poland as a totalitarian regime is to do grave injustice to the present Polish system and also to misunderstand the distinguishing features of totalitarianism.[3] Is Poland, then, a kind of democracy? That,

[2] According to informants in Warsaw, the political loyalties of the Central Committee as of early this summer were as follows: 20-25 with Natolin sympathies, 20 for the Zambrowski group, 15 stalwart Gomulka-men, 15 former Social Democrats most likely to support Gomulka but probably willing to go a little further than he, 4-5 outspoken proponents of further democratization. Since then, the author would be inclined to count the first two groups together, but with a few of the second group going over to Gomulka, who can thus be fairly certain of a little more than a majority.

[3] It might be noted that while the pre-Gomulka government was totalitarian, it was "artificial" in the sense that it was imposed from outside and not indigenous. In the writer's view it would thus be a mistake to attempt to draw broad theoretical conclusions about possible evolutionary trends of totalitarianism on the basis of the Polish experience.

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The Scales of Justice

How strangely balanced
Are the scales of justice:
Naked truth weighs more
Than truth attired

—From *Magazyn Polski* (Warsaw), February 1957.

too, is an unwarranted conclusion. The essential ingredients of a democratic system are glaringly lacking. The Sejm still remains a declaratory body with a composition which does not reflect the political orientation of the vast majority. Censorship still is in effect in the press and radio, although foreign jamming has ceased. Rule of law exists on a very tenuous basis, although much progress has been made and the era of political depravity has indeed passed.

As one seeks for some conceptual framework which could fit the present Polish regime, similarities with some aspects of the prewar Central European semi-dictatorships or even with that of Franco come to mind. The regime is certainly authoritarian, yet it does not rest on such institutions as a monolithic party or a ferocious secret police, as in totalitarian regimes. It is much more relaxed, it relies much more on the traditional attitudes of the people. It owes much to the Cardinal and the Church for avoiding a bloody civil war—which gives the church as an institution a negative political role mildly suggestive of a pluralistic system. In the countryside the government attempts to gain peasant support through its electoral ally, the United Peasant Party (ZSL), although lately fears have been voiced by the Communists that the ZSL is doing a little too well![4]

But above all else, the regime rests on the popularity of Gomulka and on the people's fear, contempt and hatred of the Russians. The two—the popularity and the hate—are inseparable. Gomulka gained his standing by becoming a symbol of national rejection of Soviet domination. And the hatred is universal; one encounters it everywhere. An average worker will bitterly recount stories of Soviet exploitation. A Polish scholar will speak with pride of the recent June clash between Polish philosophers and Soviet academicians in the Soviet Academy of Science (in Moscow) where, after being attacked for revisionism, the head of the Polish delegation (A. Schaff, a known Communist) replied with fury, scornfully informing his Soviet colleagues that Soviet philosophy is the laughing stock of the world and that the Poles will go their own way in this respect. And in Cracow in the student theater "Piwnica" "("The Cave"), the most popular presentation last spring was one in which Shepilov's speech on art (it is to be noted that Shepilov at the time was still a CPSU Secretary) was read verbatim and without comment to the assembled audience, which would split with contemptuous laughter. It is these feelings which provide the unifying element behind Gomulka's regime and which give us a clue toward understanding it.

Gomulka's regime can best be described as a Government of National Defense. It is so viewed by most Poles who, after all, are not Communists. It is a government which for political reasons they do not like but which for reasons of national survival they will support to the end. The support given by the Cardinal is certainly of this type. Stretching the point a little, the situation is analogous to that of the Laborites in England who, while remembering the General Strike of 1926 and Churchill's role in it, still supported the Prime Minister in England's crucial hour. A Government of National Defense is obviously transitional and has but one aim—to defend the nation against outside danger (in this case, Soviet political domination)—and as such it is frequently forgiven for many of its omissions, concessions and compromises. This is the case with the Gomulka regime. Even those who were disappointed with Gomulka's behavior early in 1957

[4] The ZSL is the regime-sponsored successor to the abolished Mikolajczyk Polish Peasant Party (PSL).

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and pessimistic about the future are now beginning to feel that in the long-run his major task is to cement a measure of Polish autonomy. In that task he has almost universal support, even though opinions vary on specific measures and on the degree of democratization immediately possible.

From Politics to Economics

However, as stated above, a Government of National Defense is a transitional one. As political successes fade into history and Polish political autonomy is taken more for granted, the "national defense" character of Gomulka's government will also gradually wear thin. Economic considerations will then become the measure of public judgment. Even as early as this summer more and more people in Poland were beginning to evaluate Gomulka's regime in terms of economics. For the moment the situation was helped by a bumper crop, continuing Soviet deliveries and the morale value of the small American loan. In the long run, however, the Polish economy cannot recover from its present debacle without large-scale foreign aid.

It is at this point that Soviet calculations become crucial to Poland's future. Moscow probably realizes that to deny aid to Poland will create havoc and misery and will leave Gomulka only one of two ways out: to capitulate to Moscow in order to gain economic support, or to treat the situation again as a matter of national survival, threatening an open break. Given the character of the internal Polish situation (as described above) Gomulka would have no real choice but to do the latter. At this stage Moscow would have to intervene politically, *i.e.* with force, or risk the loss of Poland. This clearly suggests that economic pressure *per se* will not solve for Moscow the dilemma of Gomulka's Poland. Only by political intervention could Moscow reassert a measure of its control, and the longer the delay, the more difficult it would be to effect such intervention successfully.

It is therefore much more likely that Moscow will continue to grant economic aid to Gomulka, hoping to gain moderate concessions, and relying in the long run on a community of interests (involving among other issues the Oder-Neisse line[5]) to keep Poland tied securely to the USSR. This would seem to be in keeping with Khrushchev's apparent attempts to provide a more stable basis for intra-bloc relations than Stalin's reliance on pure political control.[6] Certainly the past few years have amply demonstrated the organic inadequacies of past Soviet solutions. Under these conditions Poland, gradually but increasingly, will be able to assert its independence as long as it succeeds in avoiding giving Moscow cause for direct political intervention.

If Poland obtains a growing measure of economic support from the West (some credits have already been obtained from France, the US and the UK), the political significance of Soviet economic cooperation will diminish. However, political ties with the USSR will have to be maintained on a close basis in order to make certain that an open break, à la Hungary, does not occur. Most Poles seem to feel that given the attitude of other Communist parties (particularly the Chinese and the Yugoslav), the Soviets could not intervene in Poland unless a situation of the Hungarian type were to prevail. It is this belief which makes the Poles feel much more confident today than six months ago, although many are fearful that the West will not recognize the long-range opportunities involved.

With Poland's economy developed to a measure of prosperity and with its political autonomy successfully maintained, the ideological impact of Poland on its Communist neighbors, even including the USSR, would be further increased, while domestically the process of democratization would necessarily involve greater responsiveness to public opinion. Given the revisionistic and soul-searching climate prevailing even among the Polish Communists, at least the more thoughtful of them (their meditations were in many cases prompted by long sojourns in Stalinist jails), this kind of trend could develop even if Poland officially were to continue to wear the label of a "people's democracy." Such a combination of economic prosperity and growing political freedom could well prove irresistible to the other "socialist" states, and in this sense Poland could really become the umbilical cord of the "socialist camp."

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[5] The writer was told on good authority this summer in Warsaw that during the recent Gomulka-Ulbricht conversations the East Germans put out a suggestion (to Jedrychowski, the Polish chief planner) that the port of Szczecin (or Stettin) be exploited and directed jointly. Jedrychowski, after consulting the top leadership, refused even to discuss this feeler, and the Polish-East German declaration subsequently reiterated the finality of the Oder-Neisse line. Nonetheless, the Poles remained apprehensive since they felt that the East Germans, so supine *vis-à-vis* the Russians, would never have dared to take such initiative on their own. This certainly illustrates the powerful lever that the Russians hold over the Poles.

[6] See my "Ideology and Power: Crisis in the Soviet Bloc," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February), 1957.

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Guided Tourism in China

By Richard L. Walker

OVER RECENT MONTHS the Mao regime has shown a surprising disposition to disclose—both explicitly and implicitly—the existence of unrest, discontent, resistance and failures in Communist China. These disclosures have permitted a more realistic assessment of conditions in China than was heretofore possible; in this respect they have also served to underscore the inaccuracy of impressions gained by some of the many recent foreign visitors to the mainland. For example, a group of visitors returning to Hong Kong in April 1957 commented upon the enthusiasm and support of Chinese youth for the regime. This was at the very time Peiping was beginning to release cautious reports of protest demonstrations and strikes among the students. Again, a report by a seven-man Indian study group which had spent three months in China in 1956 was released in New Delhi on June 2, 1957. Although two members issued a dissenting opinion, the majority report stressed the "success" of China's cooperative movement in the countryside, commenting on its voluntary aspects and on popular "enthusiasm," and recommending a similar program for increasing agricultural production in India. This report appeared after the new wave of "self-criticism" in China had led to admissions of widespread peasant resistance and the excessive use of violence and force in the cooperative drive. Shortly afterward there were further disclosures of starvation and of a decline in livestock and agricultural production. Again, a critical Chinese observer from Singapore reproduced in a popular article in a Western travel magazine the Communist claim that illiteracy had been basically eliminated in China. This came at a moment when the Communists were acknowledging great shortcomings in their mass literacy campaign.

In these and many other such cases non-Communist visitors to mainland China have made honest and concerted efforts to be objective and factual; the inaccuracies in their reports—here paradoxically brought to light by the Communists themselves—point up the extent to which their efforts have been frustrated by the nature of their controlled visits and indicate the care which must be exercised in utilizing information provided by visitors to a totalitarian state.

For handling foreign visitors the Mao regime has applied the same techniques developed by the Soviet Communists over the past four decades. These include the effective utilization of guided tours, front organizations, cultural delegations, and controlled media of communications.[1] It will be recalled that some of the most glowing reports of conditions in the USSR were being circulated in the ouside world during those very years when Stalin's enforced collectivization, liquidation of the kulaks and subsequent great purges were taking place. Despite thousands of conscientious visitors to the Soviet Union there was comparatively little reportage of the terror, starvation, slave labor and other appalling conditions in the country to balance the rosy accounts

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[1] For a good discussion of this integrated program, and its development in the Soviet Union see Louis Nemzer, "The Soviet Friendship Societies," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1949, pp. 265-84. Modern Soviet methods of cultural diplomacy and handling of visitors are ably sketched out by Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The USSR: Monolithic Controls at Home and Abroad," in S. Neumann (Ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1956, esp. pp. 254ff.

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of a nation in progress. The actual facts behind the facade did not become manifest to the outside world until much later. The fact that the Chinese Communists have been utilizing almost identical methods for shepherding visitors to their land should give pause to those who would give uncritical attention to the reports of eye-witnesses, however capable and objective they might seem.

Organized Hospitality

Visitors to China today are handled by the China International Tourist Service, which is an agency of the Chinese People's Society for Cultural Relations with foreign countries (hereafter CPSCR). The latter organization (the counterpart of VOKS in the USSR) was established in May 1954 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and works in conjunction with the Ministry of Culture and the various mass organizations in China. Among its major functions it handles the affairs of the so-called Friendship Associations, which serve as front organizations in other countries for the distribution of Chinese Communist materials and which help to organize and direct groups visiting the mainland. CPSCR provides interpreters, arranges interviews, and in general gives guests in China flattering attention and hospitality. Such organized official attention to visitors already has paid dividends for the Mao regime in terms of many favorable reports printed abroad by non-Chinese.

In the past three years the Communist regime has stepped up its program of political tourism appreciably. The Chinese Intourist announced on February 21, 1957, that tourists from any country would be welcome in China. Actually primary attention is given to the countries of Asia (especially Japan and India) with growing overtures to Latin America. Peiping reported that in 1955, more than 4,700 visitors from 63 countries had come to China, and the *People's Daily* of January 21, 1957, claimed that the number for 1956 had increased to over 5,200 persons representing 75 countries. Of the 1956 visitors 1,243 were Japanese, according to the figures of the Japan-China Friendship Association.[2] These figures are small in comparison, for example, to the more than one million visitors to Great Britain in 1956; but the professional status of the visitors (most of them cultural figures, authors, and leaders of public opinion in their home countries), their impact when they return (a sizeable proportion write books or newspaper accounts), and the great interest which attaches to the powerful Communist state on the China mainland—these and many other reasons combine to make the handling of guests an important aspect of Peiping's conduct of foreign relations.

Most visitors or visiting delegations enter China through Hong Kong. From the moment they cross the border into Chinese territory at Shumchun and board the train to Canton, they receive personal attention and their journey moves expeditiously. The Indian, Sailakumar Mukherjee, tells how the Vice-General Secretary of CPSCR and the Vice-Secretary of the China-India Friendship Association journeyed all the way from Peiping to Shumchun to greet the 35-member Indian "friendship delegation" in 1954 and stayed with the delegation throughout its journey.[3]

The Standard Itinerary

According to authoress Han Suyin, most visitors "do" China in about twenty days.[4] Many, however, have stayed for as long as forty days to two months. The itinerary usually includes a train trip from Canton to Hankow and then on to Peiping. If the trip is by plane, then the return trip is usually by train. About one-third to one-half of the visit is passed in Peiping in a combination of interviews, conferences, parties, meetings, "cultural" activities, and short trips outside the city. Then comes a trip to China's industrial heart, Manchuria. This is sometimes followed by a journey into West China, to Sian, Lanchow, and possibly the new oil center at Yumen. Some go to the wartime capital of Chungking where an ostentatious combination guest-house and cultural palace has been erected. Many tourists visit Mao's birthplace and talk to an uncle of his (one correspondent refers to "uncles" working in shifts), and most visit Shanghai and Hangchow and

[2] New China News Agency, Peiping, January 10, 1957.

[3] This trip was arranged by the China-India Friendship Association. Sailakumar Mukherjee, *A Visit to New China* (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee & Co., Ltd.) 1956, p. 7.

[4] Chinese by birth, Han Suyin recently returned to Peiping for a visit and has published an account of her impressions in *Holiday* magazine, (Philadelphia) June 1957, in an article entitled "Peking Today." She states, "China is Chinese, and is also the Asian miracle, the country that has achieved sufficiency of food in the shortest time for the largest agglomeration of people on earth." This article appeared the very month when (June 17) Radio Peiping admitted that fifteen million persons were starving in one province alone.

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then return to Hong Kong. There are, of course, variations on this itinerary, but most of those who have written accounts of their visits to China have followed roughly the same course.

Peiping itself has always been hailed as one of the most beautiful cities in the world. "From all the countries of Asia and from the rest of the world they come to see it . . . Propelled, conducted by the Chinese equivalent of Intourist, they are interested in the difference from 'old China,' 'old Peking.' " [5] There could be no better spot for the extensive briefing and self-confident recital of figures which prepare most visitors for the rest of their trip around China. Usually invitations are timed so that the guests can see one of the mass demonstrations or parades of power staged on such occasions as the international Communist holiday, May 1; Red Army Day, August 1; or the anniversary of the proclamation of the regime, October 1. The Japanese journalist Hitoshi Wada states that he and some fellow Japanese were invited to China in 1955 with the stipulation that they enter within a specified ten-day period. He believes that this was to insure the presence of the Japanese journalists at the time of the visit of the then Indonesian premier Ali Sastroamidjojo. The Chinese leaders put on a tremendous parade of their ability to organize and control masses of people for the visiting Indonesian.[6]

From Peiping visitors go to the Great Wall, visit the university center out toward the West Hills, tour the model Taiping Village a short distance to the West. Some visitors ask to see a prison and are taken to a model jail in the suburbs of Peiping outside the city wall. The Indian Professor J. C. Jain; James Cameron, correspondent of the London *News Chronicle;* the London Editor of *Ce Soir,* Adalbert de Segonzac; G. S. Gale who accompanied the Attlee mission to China in 1954; Robert Guillain, correspondent of *Le Monde*—these and many others have published accounts of visits to the same jail where they are given the same briefing by the same person on how the prisoners (two-thirds of them political) are enjoying their "reform through labor service." [7]

In Manchuria visitors see various new industrial plants: A few have gone as far north as Harbin to see the new Precision Instrument and Cutting Tool Factory and the jute factory located there. Most confine their visit to four main centers. They go to Changchun to see the new Motor Car Factory No. 1, and they visit the industrial triangle of the cities Mukden, Fushun, and Anshan. Anshan is very impressive with its new rolling mill, blast furnaces and seamless tube steel plant. Most visitors also take a side trip to the Kao Kan collective farm near Mukden.

In their later accounts many of the tourists have reproduced the history and statistics rattled off for them during their tour. Cameron, one of the more discerning of the visitors, comments on such a visit:

> **And then one saw the simple peasant, chosen at random, and he was so palpably well rehearsed, one's questions faded away; one asked for a village and one found oneself in a place so immaculate that its roads were tramped smooth by the feet of endless delegations that had gone before.[8]**

At Fushun several of the delegations have been introduced to the same model worker. Cameron remarks, "I felt as though I had been talking to a brochure. It often happened that way." [9]

"Guidance" with a Velvet Glove

There is, then, a fairly standard schedule for visitors to China. Occasionally an inquisitive reporter will wander from the beaten path; but there are now a sufficient number of published accounts of these visits to indicate their unformity—matching the dull, drab uniformity which pervades so much of the Chinese scene today and on which so many observers have commented.[10] Some visitors emerge feeling that they have avoided the guided tour routine. The Indian journalist A. K. Reddy reported that he had "steered clear of the

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[5] Han Suyin, *ibid.,* p. 101. Unfortunately few of the visitors to date ever knew either "old China" or "old Peiping."

[6] Hitoshi Wada, "A Journalist's View of Communist China," *Japan Quarterly,* Vol. 3, No. 1, January-March 1956, pp. 17-26.

[7] J. C. Jain, *Amidst the Chinese People* (New Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons), 1955, p. 112; James Cameron, *Mandarin Red* (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc.,) 1955, pp. 104-9; Adalbert de Segonzac, *Visa pour Pekin* (Paris: Gallimard), 1956, pp. 142-46; George S. Gale, *No Flies in China* (New York: William Morrow & Co.), 1956, pp. 124-26. Robert Guillain has published two series of articles: "China after Six Years," *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* February 9, 16, 23, March 1, 8, 1956; "I saw Communist China," *The Saturday Evening Post,* May 19, 26, June 2, 1956. The proportion of political prisoners is cited from Guillain.

[8] Cameron, *op. cit.,* p. 113.

[9] *Ibid,* p. 177.

[10] Wada comments on this uniformity, p. 26. So does the correspondent of the Melbourne *Herald,* Reg Leonard, whose series of eight articles was reproduced in *The New York Times,* August 21-28, 1956. Cameron and Guillain also were distressed by the drabness, especially in clothing.

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beaten track of a conducted tour," but his account indicates that he saw exactly the same sights and institutions as other delegations. Even the perceptive Scotsman James Cameron, who feels that he "saw a great deal more than has been seen for some years," reports on the same model factories, farms, collectives, Shanghai kindergarten, and other sights as, for example, the Indian Dhirendranath Das Gupta, Adalbert de Segonzac and others. Swiss reporter Peter Schmid remarks: "The Travel Bureau functions with smooth efficiency as long as the visitor sticks to the beaten track; it breaks down completely as soon as he takes a single step off the tourist trail." [11]

There are numerous other obstacles which stand in the way of balanced reportage of visits to the Communist mainland, even for those who go to Mao's China with a determination to penetrate through the organized hospitality. First, of course, is the language problem. Very few of the visitors have had previous experience in China and must rely on the aid of interpreters provided by CPSCR. Several have noticed that the interpreters are usually young and that their knowledge of the particular foreign language involved is strictly book-learning. Peter Schmid feels that the regime does not trust the Chinese who have lived abroad and prefers to rely on younger and politically more reliable cadres. He notes that "for anyone coming into contact with foreigners, loyalty to the party line is more important than ability." [12]

It is difficult for the non-Chinese-speaking guest to get around without guides and although many visitors are under the impression that they are free to go where they will, supervision is such as to indicate that all has been well planned in advance. To quote Cameron again:

I found myself beside a young man who by chance spoke English, who was by chance going to Canton, who by chance knew both my name and my mission, and who by chance was in a position to stand by me until the end of the ride. He was more than amiable; in the end I was sorry to lose him, but somehow he was always replaced. . . . As we ground into Canton station . . . the new government man appeared with superlative timing precisely at my window. . . .[13]

For those who ask to visit places or persons unacceptable for the guided tour, there is usually the reply that the hosts will try to arrange it, but the scheduled visit is naturally over before any reply is forthcoming. No foreign visitors has yet been permitted to rove the countryside at will. None has talked with such controversial purged intellectuals as Professors Liang Shuming or Hu Feng. Places to which visitors are denied access include Tibet, minority areas, border regions, the coastline of South China, defense works, forced labor camps, and famine and flood areas. Few see any but model developments, few have talked to any but officially appointed spokesmen. Anonymous conversations on park benches would be about the best the foreigner could hope to achieve in terms of getting unofficial views. One Chinese from Tientsin is quoted as saying: "Even we Chinese dare not discuss public affairs among ourselves for fear of being denounced in some future campaign of criticism and self-criticism; how then could a foreign visitor expect us to tell him the truth." [14] Robert Guillain has also commented on the uniformity of official answers, even those given in private.[15]

Further difficulties for the visitors are the crowded schedules devised by their hosts, the time taken up by gestures of overwhelming official hospitality (especially the superb Chinese banquets and dinners), and the obligation to pay courteous attention to the lectures provided by the government for tourists' "convenience." [16] Within China local newspapers are not allowed to circulate freely, and the news which would enable the observer to place his observations within a

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[11] Peter Schmid, "Report from Red China," translated by R. Winston, *The Reporter* July 12, 1956, p. 27. Schmid is one of the more pessimistic of China's visitors concerning what one can learn on the guided tour: "The foreigner in China has not the slightest prospect of seeing the inner workings of the administration and finding out how the omnipotent, irrational bureaucratic machine treats the individual Chinese who happens to be caught in its gears. The visitor's only link with the government is the state Travel Bureau, which holds him tight in its claws and directs his every act unless he summons the energy to break free of it" (p. 27).

[12] *Ibid,* p. 27. Robert Guillain also comments on the youth of interpreters: see *The Saturday Evening Post,* May 26, 1956, p. 125.

[13] Cameron, *op cit.* pp. 10 and 14.

[14] *China News Analysis,* a weekly newsletter published in Hong Kong, No. 142, August 3, 1956, p. 2. This is the first in a series of five issues of CNA entitled "Roving the Country," and devoted to analysis of what can be learned about various sections of China from a monitoring of the Chinese press in Hong Kong. The series indicates clearly how much can be missed by the guided tourist. (See also Nos. 143, 149, 159, and 171).

[15] Guillain, *The Saturday Evening Post,* (Philadelphia) May 26, 1956, p. 125.

[16] Gale, Cameron, Schmid, and Guillain all comment extensively on some of this sort of difficulty.

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context is confined to official briefings, handouts, and the few papers and magazines which are official at the national level. Frequently the visitor must wait until he leaves Communist territory and reaches the Hong Kong listening post before he can ascertain the full current picture and how his limited observations fit into it.[17] It was in Hong Kong that the story of the 1954 floods, the worst in Chinese history, broke. Most of the visitors to the mainland in the late spring and summer that year knew nothing about the seriousness of the situation until they left China.[18]

Information *vs.* Propaganda

All this tends to point up one of the most important ramifications and implications of the eye-witness visit. The individual visitor to Mao's China is obviously so limited in the duration and extent of his travels that he must rely on the figures of the regime for placing what he has seen into some sort of overall account when he makes his report after leaving China. Obviously, he cannot find out from personal experience the figures, for example, on the production of foodstuffs or steel. He therefore finds himself in the position of having to repeat or reproduce in black and white the statistics provided by the Communists. The fact that he has been to China in turn tends to lend a certain air of authenticity to the figures he quotes, even though he may be cautious enough to note that they have been provided by his hosts. Thus the regime has at least some control over the information which foreigners disseminate. Many Indian visitors have, for instance, reproduced on faith figures on the Chinese land tenure situation before the Communists came to power, figures which subsequent Communist reports have indicated were sheer fabrication.[19]

Obviously the regime is interested in showing, and most visitors interested in seeing, what is new in the new China. Because the guided tour includes new industrial plants, new housing and model installations, even the most cynical observer is likely to get the impression that the Communists are accomplishing wonders, that everything is new, that progress is the only thing to report about China. Indeed many of the spanking new plants are impressive and do make good showpieces. Anshan is enormous, but as Schmid points out, it hardly compares with some of the new installations in Japan and West Germany. By contrasting old and new the Communists make the erroneous suggestion that modern industry and planning were nonexistent before they came to power. Some visitors are intellectuals and cultural leaders who have not troubled to visit works in their own countries of the type they are shown in China. They come from countries where official government tours, monolithic presentation, and boasting are not official policy. Many are as a matter of course taken in by a tour confined only to items which will create a favorable impression. Mukherjee comments:

> **I could feel that many members of our delegation to China were not even aware of many similar or greater accomplishments of India when we were shown industries or handicrafts of China or the progress China had made in art and culture. A member who has not seen a single river valley project in India was vociferous in praising the achievements of China in this matter when he saw one of her river valley projects which in magnitude was not one-tenth of our big projects.[20]**

THESE, THEN, are some of the difficulties which stand in the way of making visits to Mao's China all that either the participant or the outsider to whom he communicates might wish. There is another ramification of this form of cultural relations among nations which deserves some comment. Visitors whose interests and functions remain outside the pale of government concern in their own countries are brought into close association with Chinese individuals and groups whose activities are of intimate concern to the Communist regime. As leading figures in their own countries they can then become influential exponents of some of the goals of the Communist regime without being consciously aware that they are being so used. Their speeches of thanks to their hosts are made to sound like endorsements of the policies and proposals of the Peiping regime, and their reproduction of Communist official handouts gives added weight to the claims and statistics by which sober and critical appraisal—and indeed un-

[17] For a discussion of Hong Kong as a listening post see articles by a special correspondent in *The Economist,* September 1, 1956, pp. 722-23, and by Guy Searls, "The Hong Kong Outpost," *The New Republic,* April 8, 1957, pp. 11-13. See also CNA, No. 142.

[18] Searls, *ibid,* p. 12.

[19] Mukherjee, *op. cit.,* pp. 57-70; Jain, *op. cit.,* pp. 66-77; and Dhirendranath Das Gupta, *With Nehru in China* (Calcutta: National Book Agency Limited), November 1955, pp. 37-60 all repeat the Communist figures uncritically. On this particular item see the author's *China under Communism* (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1955, pp. 128-53.

[20] Mukherjee, *ibid,* p. 133.

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favorable revelations from leaders in Peiping themselves—are pushed into the background.

Despite some of the problems and implications sketched briefly above, the accounts of some of the more discerning guided tourists have aided in offering understanding of China today. These accounts must be read in conjunction with a close monitoring of the Chinese press and of the reports of refugees who continue to pour into Hong Kong and Macao. Such observers as Hitoshi Wada, E. S. Kirby, James Cameron, Robert Guillain, Peter Schmid, George S. Gale and many others have helped to balance the more uncritical accounts of recognized or admitted fellow travellers. All of the named observers have, with one word or another, agreed on the tragic fact that "a formerly shrill, noisy, infinitely amusing nation has become silent, bored and gloomy," to quote Guillain.[21] In this sense, they have provided a background of first-hand observation to help explain the recent flow of reports, and even official hints, of mass dissatisfaction and discontent emanating from Mao's China.

[21] Guillain, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 1, 1956, p. 5.

"COME AND SEE"—PEIPING'S SUBTLEST WEAPON

If I must speak in the simplified terms of propaganda, I am quite ready to concede that there is no "bamboo curtain." Did I not obtain my visa for Peiping in the first place? I obtained it without difficulty, simply by sending in a direct telegraphic request. Was I prevented from moving about? Not exactly: I covered 12,000 kilometers in two months. Did I see some interesting regions? Certainly yes. . . . Was I followed by the police, watched, spied upon? I was not aware of it . . .

And yet a more subtle "curtain" never ceased to be drawn, cleverly and tenaciously, between me and China. Mark this well. There are 600 million Chinese, but in two months I was never permitted to speak with a single one in private. If I did, it was by subterfuge. There are 500 million peasants, but I got nowhere when I asked to stay a few days in a village, or even just 24 hours. I was never able to enter a house picked by myself at random. I never stopped at a factory, a farm, or any institution whatever without the visit having been arranged in advance. I tried to talk—without witnesses—with Catholics, with a non-"progressive" clergyman, and with a former landowner; [I tried] to visit a labor-reform camp for "reactionaries, *etc.* Wasted effort. . . .

Nothing is ever improvised. I wish to see a Chinese family? It is chosen for me, the hour, the locale, the car to go there. I would like to meet a Shanghai capitalist, a species on the way to extinction. He is chosen with care and, as I learn later, the same one whom twenty visitors before me have gone to see. Wherever I go a reception committee awaits me, vigilant, garbed in blue cotton uniform . . . I am not asked first what I would like to know, but am subjected to an advance exposition of what I *ought* to know. . . . There is never any question of free discussion on any subject whatever.

We are taken to see an agricultural cooperative and proudly shown a tractor. Do you know how many tractors there are in China for 500 million peasants? 2,700—Russian, of course. A farm cooperative with a tractor is therefore hardly representative—it is the rarest exception. . . .

"Come and see!" This invitation is one of China's most formidable weapons, a weapon which she uses with consummate skill.

—Translated from one of a series of articles "600 Millions de Chinois dans l'engrenage communiste," by Robert Guillain, Le Monde (Paris), January 18, 1956. Reprint rights must be obtained from Le Monde.)

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Toward Understanding Totalitarianism

By Donald W. Treadgold

SHORTLY AFTER the Nazis seized power in Germany in 1933, the realization began to spread among students of politics that a new type of state was in process of creation there. The similarities between nazism and Italian fascism—eleven years its senior—at once suggested the need for careful comparison. Except for a few penetrating writers, however, political scientists were slower to perceive the parallelism between those two and the Soviet system, especially since the Nazis and the Communists exchanged professions of sharp hostility. Moreover, the illusion persisted that Russian communism, which originated from the political "left," was (or would become) a variant of democracy, rather than of totalitarianism. Only about the time of the breakdown of the wartime Grand Alliance did the concept of totalitarianism come to be broadly accepted as applicable to both nazism (by then defunct) and Soviet communism.

The word "totalitarianism" has been recently defined by Zbigniew Brzezinski to mean "a system where technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the condition of man, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population." [1] No doubt some will prefer a slightly different definition, but Brzezinski's formulation is based on analytical conclusions, most of which are by this time shared by the outstanding scholars in the field.

Those conclusions owe much to the pioneering but still fundamental work of Hannah Arendt in comparing nazism and communism. *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) consisted of three luminous essays on anti-Semitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism.[2] Anti-Semitism, singled out by the author as the cardinal element in Nazi doctrine, was declining in Europe after a brief revival at the end of the last century, when Hitler refurbished it for his own use. Imperialism, Miss Arendt contends, marked "the first stage in the political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism" (p. 138), during which a reckless, profit-seeking utilitarianism migrated from private to public life and was used to justify an era of conquest. The "mob" was drawn into alliance with the bourgeoisie, racism became the ideology of "imperialistic policies," and imperialism emerged as an immoral Great Game, whose practitioner *par excellence* was the British soldier-adventurer T. E. Lawrence. All this is extremely provocative. But whether or not the classical imperialism of Britain and France owes as much as Miss Arendt thinks to the "bourgeoisie," she is in any case less interested in it than in the "continental imperialism" of pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism. To these two suprapolitical, nonparty movements, nazism and bolshevism respectively are said to owe a greater debt "than to any other political movement" (p. 222). This assertion appears some pages later in a revised version: anti-Semitism is set alongside pan-Germanism as Nazi precursor, and pan-

[1] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. I, No. 3, September 1956, p. 754.

[2] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1951, 477 pp.

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Slavism is replaced by "the international concept of revolutionary socialism" as Bolshevik forerunner (p. 394). Of these four movements, revolutionary socialism is the only one the author does not analyze at length elsewhere; and what exactly the debt of the totalitarianisms was to any of them she does not explain.

MISS ARENDT'S essay on totalitarianism, however, can stand alone. She deals brilliantly with the contrast between the Nazis' and Bolsheviks' genuinely unlimited aims—which in both cases scorned the nation, the law and the individual alike—and with their pretenses at nationalism, at a "new type of legality," and at devotion to human welfare. She points out that however grandiose the lies and myths of each system, they require careful examination, for "over and above the senselessness of totalitarian society is enthroned the ridiculous supersense of its ideological superstitution" (p. 431).

A number of differences between the two systems are indicated. For example, the purge of the elite had a much less important role in nazism than in communism. The Nazis never went to the lengths the Soviets did, during the late 1930's, in ordering the arrest of a fixed percentage of the whole population, while the Soviets never developed a group quite comparable to the deliberately brutalized SS, nor did they adopt the technique of stuffing their enemies into ovens *en masse*. Himmler and other high Nazis had greater scope for autonomous action than any of Stalin's underlings. Other differences, such as the less primitive form of the Soviets' doctrines, their lip service to reason and education, and their success in appealing to citizens of all countries, are not developed, perhaps because the author conceived the chief task as clarifying the unrecognized similarities, not the dissimilarities.

Her social analysis interprets totalitarianism as a marriage of the "mob" (a by-product of capitalist production, from which the totalitarian leaders came) and the "masses" (which emerged from the breakdown of bourgeois-dominated class society). The leaders proceeded to disintegrate the associations and classes which made up the social organization of the countries they took over, and to try to break through church, school, and family, leaving the individual as socially unprotected as he was juridically naked, and at their mercy.

Miss Arendt's chief concern is the attempt by the totalitarians at "the transformation of human nature itself" (p. 432), which sets off totalitarianism from movements or powers which seek merely revolution or conquest. The "laboratories" of their goal are the concentration camps, whose peculiar crime is the "greater sin than murder," the removal of the human being from the "whole sphere of legality" (p. 437), and the destruction of what our world calls his humanity. Her book contains much profound analysis (as well as a powerful indictment) and demolishes many misconceived aphorisms. However, it pays less attention to totalitarianism's institutional structure than to its ideological foundations, precisely because the "roots" Miss Arendt discovers lie in the realm of ideology; and not all the strands of analysis are woven together.

THE AUTHOR'S contention that nazism and communism were specimens of a single genus was taken for granted by the participants in a conference on totalitarianism held in 1953.[8] True, Raymond Bauer argued that communism's "rationalism and intellectualism" distinguished it from nazism (p. 156), and J. P. Nettl believed the dynamic character of Communist economics made the system "fundamentally different" from nazism (p. 307), but neither one challenged the applicability of the term "totalitarianism" to both. Like the Arendt book, the conference paid more attention to ideological problems than to the institutional structure of the systems discussed. Carl J. Friedrich did offer a list of five criteria of totalitarianism which included, along with ideology, four institutions (single party, communications monopoly, arms monopoly, and secret police, the latter three being in the hands of the first), but the discussion was not structured around them. The concentration on ideology led to remarks by psychologists about a universal "authoritarian personality" from which totalitarianism presumably was or could be made. Although one speaker declared that "the basic difference between Western liberal society and totalitarianism is that the former is ideologically pluralistic" (p. 136), no one urged institutional pluralism as a fundamental and distinctive feature of the West which the totalitarians aimed at eradicating. Friedrich rightly but vainly warned against limiting the discussion to nazism and Russian communism and neglecting communism in China and Eastern Europe (p. 338). Two chief tasks remained: pressing the analysis of the in-

[8] Carl J. Friedrich, ed.: *Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 1953,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1954, 386 pp.

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stitutional side of totalitarianism, and extending beyond the confines of Europe the examination of the history of both ideas and institutions giving rise to or facilitating the exercise of totalitarian power.

LAST YEAR Friedrich, together with Zbigniew Brzezinski, published a book for which his participation in the 1953 conference had provided a testing ground.[4] The beginnings he had made there at developing institutional analysis were expanded. To his list of five essential features of totalitarianism was added a sixth, "centrally-directed economy." Although the authors admitted that two of the six (economic control and arms monopoly) were sometimes found in constitutional systems, the six together were said to comprise a "syndrome" which defined totalitarianism (p. 9), and the bulk of the book consists of an analysis of each of these features successively at some length. The analysis is generally lucid and compelling. Illustrations are drawn in appropriately varying proportions from Nazi, Fascist, and Soviet systems, without implying an identity among the three. Especially useful is the treatment of East Germany, the only instance of continuity between nazism and communism; the authors show how the Communist administration revived and extended Nazi controls over the bureaucracy, courts and the economy. Friedrich and Brzezinski succeed in treating totalitarianism in Europe as a whole. As far as it goes, the book is an excellent treatment of the subject—in fact, the best to date.

However, certain weaknesses deserve mention. First, a compulsive "realism" leads the authors to scorn any "demand" from the West that those oppressed by communism "rise and overthrow their tormentors" as "quite preposterous" (p. 289)—and so the "demand" might be, but a few months after the book was written the Hungarians did just that, however fleetingly. Evidently the likelihood of a revolution (which depends on those oppressed) has been confused with the chances of its success (which depends on both the power of the apparatus and the attitude and actions of outside forces).

A second weakness is the authors' effort to treat the "historical roots" of totalitarian ideologies. While it is flatly denied that "this or that thinker or group of thinkers" can be held "responsible" for certain ideologies (p. 88), it is argued that the latter are "dialectically" related to Christianity and democracy. It is not clear why Marx, for example, should escape at least some kind of "dialectical" link with totalitarianism, although Christian and democratic "bodies of thought" have to be collectively related to it.

Third, little pretense is made at treating Chinese communism. In his 1953 study Friedrich had been uncertain whether to include China as a totalitarian dictatorship *(Totalitarianism,* p. 57); by contrast, the later book does contain a number of references to China, and some of them are apt and accurate. However, at one point it is clearly (and erroneously) implied that pre-Communist China had a dominant transcendental theology (p. 88), and there are some casual but highly controversial allusions to Mao's "alteration" of Communist ideology to take account of peasant predominance in China.

A fourth weakness arises in the authors' attempt to classify totalitarian dictatorship. They assert that it belongs with tyranny and despotism in a larger class of systems called "autocracy" (in which the "ruler" is not responsible to anyone else) as distinguished from "heterocracy" (in which he is); but in discussing types of autocracy (p. 6), they scarcely make clear that incomparably the most pervasive and important type of despotism throughout world history has been that existing in the Orient. Whether or not the authors sustain their contention that totalitarian dictatorship is a "logical extension of certain traits of our modern industrial society (oftentimes called 'capitalism')" (p. 3), it is of fundamental importance that the pluralism of Western society powerfully impedes the establishment of totalitarian despotism, while in contrast the Asian and African countries imminently threatened by Communist control have never developed such a plurality of institutions. If one looks mainly at Europe and its intellectual history, then Christianity, democracy, and technology may appear to be the matrix of totalitarianism; if one looks also at Asia and compares institutional patterns, the perspective alters significantly.

THE CONCLUSION of Friedrich and Brzezinski is that, although nazism and fascism were destroyed by a war to which their own attributes made a decisive contribution, it is unwarranted to expect communism to commit suicide in similar (or some other) fashion. Tracing the development of totalitarianism through four characteristic stages—ideology, movement, party, and government—the authors find, in each case they have discussed, a point of "break-through" at which the totalitarian pattern became fixed: in the USSR this occurred during the 1930's, in Germany after 1934, in Italy in

[4] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski: *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956, 346 pp.

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1924-1936, in eastern Europe after 1948, in China before Mao's victory in 1949. After that point, it is argued, internal revolution becomes well-nigh impossible. Moreover, the authors discount the possibility of internal transformation as a response to the demands of bureaucratic routinization or technological rationality, a prospect which has been foreseen by Isaac Deutscher, Barrington Moore, and others in considerably varying degrees.[5] It is suggested that as in the past communism will seek to combine "relaxation" of international tension with the aggressive exploitation of instabilities abroad, and will continue to deal with its grave domestic difficulties and dissatisfactions by whatever means are necessary, without trying to escape from them via wars of open aggression in the near future. The "possibly lasting qualities" of totalitarian dictatorship are therefore strongly emphasized. "More particularly," the authors add, "the inroads of totalitarianism into the Orient, where despotic forms of government have been the rule for thousands of years, ought to give one pause, and prevent any too optimistic estimate of the totalitarians' lack of capacity for survival" (p. 294).

IN THE SENTENCE just quoted, Friedrich and Brzezinski indicate perhaps the chief task which remains for students of totalitarianism—the broadening of the historical base of study beyond Europe. Few Western scholars so far have been prepared for the complexity and magnitude of such an investigation. In his new book, *Oriental Despotism,*[6] Karl A. Wittfogel has taken a long step in the direction of an adequate taxonomy of autocratic regimes on a worldwide basis. Both the despotism of the Orient and modern Western totalitarianism, he argues, represent forms of "total statism," but only the latter "combines total political power with total social and intellectual control" (p. 440). His subject is the distribution and character of Oriental despotism, which originated, he believes, in regions where "hydraulic society" (the social configuration resulting from the need for central management of irrigation in China, for example) developed, but which was not subsequently confined to such areas. He offers a number of comparisons which clarify the nature of totalitarianism. In the Eastern despotisms the family, the village, the guild might be left as areas of "politically irrelevant freedom" (p. 124), the quasi-official ideologists were relatively free as regards doctrine (p. 320), there was no state party (p. 358)—while none of these things are true under totalitarianism. The discussion of Lenin's ambivalent fears of an "Asiatic restoration" (*i.e.,* the creation of a monopoly bureaucracy) in Russia and the story of Stalin's outright suppression of Marx's theory of an "Asiatic mode of production" fill a glaring hiatus in the standard works on the ideological aspects of the Soviet system. However, it is Wittfogel's comparative and worldwide institutional analysis, although set forth in his book only in passing, which contributes most to the understanding of totalitarianism, in comparison and contrast to the relatively open and "multicentered" societies of Western Europe and America on the one hand, and on the other to the Asian and African countries whose governments, often democratic in form, rule unsteadily over relatively closed societies which are still in transition from the forms of Eastern despotism. Many will feel that overschematism and overrefinement creep into Wittfogel's analysis of Oriental despotism. However, it is both the chief merit of his book and his main contribution to the comparative analysis of totalitarianism that he has carried Western institutional history beyond the restricted confines of its own antecedents, and has incidentally opened the way for Asian thinkers to re-examine critically the development of their own countries. Whatever the weaknesses of his approach, neither Western nor Eastern scholars considering totalitarian systems can afford to ignore the problems he raises or the worldwide perspective in which they have their setting. The way thereby opens for a book to be written which in its scope of analysis will mark a significant advance over Friedrich's and Brzezinski's, as theirs was over Arendt's.

THE PREDICAMENT of the individual under totalitarianism is considered in passing, with varying degrees of success, by all the writers so far mentioned, but it is the novelists who have plumbed it most deeply, particularly Evgeny Zamiatin and George Orwell. Zamiatin's *We* (English trans., 1924),[7] an early and daring

[5] See Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality"; Isaac Deutscher, *Russia: What Next?* Oxford University Press, New York, 1953; Barrington Moore, *Terror and Progress USSR,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1954.

[6] Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1956, 556 pp.

[7] Eugene Zamiatin, *We,* translation from the Russian (unpublished) by Gregory Zilboorg, E. P. Dutton & Company, New York, 1924, 286 pp.; later published in Russian by Chekhov Publishing House, New York, 1952. Zamiatin's novel was refused publication in Moscow; when a re-translated version of the English edition trickled back to the USSR, the book was banned. Zamiatin himself left the USSR in 1929 and died in Paris in 1937.

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protest against the stifling of the individual, anticipated Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) [8] both in concept and plot, although Zamiatin placed his nightmare total-state in the twenty-sixth century. Like D-503 in *We,* Winston in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is the object of advances by a girl who helps move him in the direction of a conspiracy directed against the long-established monster state. In both books an old house adorned with Victorian bric-a-brac serves as the symbolic trysting-place of the lovers, and sex and even smoking and drinking are intertwined with political rebelliousness. Both heroes are eventually caught by the state apparatus, and are subjected to psycho-physical violence which destroys their souls along with the wish to fight the regime. However, at the end of *We* the conspiracy seems on the verge of success, while Orwell's hero has to face the fact that the conspiracy he tried to join was merely a piece of provocation, and that apparently none ever existed at all. In both books one aspect of totalitarianism is seen as a massive sexual perversion, in which the normal object of love is replaced by the personification of the state. Winston, who has surrendered intellectually to his tormentors, is not really destroyed until he cries out that his beloved should be tortured in place of himself, and having renounced Julia, comes then to "love Big Brother."

Zamiatin portrayed certain features already present in the Soviet life of his time—the secret police, the fraudulent unanimity of elections, Taylorism *etc.*—and other features still far short of being actualized, such as the extermination of the peasantry, the destruction of art, and particularly the war on private thoughts. Yet even after human personality is reduced to numbers, Zamiatin is right to contend (and Orwell agrees) that germs of humanity remain, so that out of D-503's experience with the girl he can develop the disease of fancy, and medical diagnosis reveals that "apparently a soul has formed in you"—a defect eradicable only by surgery.

Zamiatin makes a straight plea for emotion as against soulless reason. His theology identifies "We" with God (and specifically with the inheritance of organized Christianity), "they" (and the thought of "I") with the devil; the slogan of the conspiracy against the regime is "MEPHI" for Mephistopheles. The pagan individualism of Zamiatin is rooted in the criticism of "Reason"; he identifies the monster state with rationality. Orwell is more concerned with the ideology and sociology of the system, and he furnishes long extracts from the supposed (actually it proves to be forged) ideological manual of the conspiracy. It is interesting that Zamiatin's novel, which stresses human emotion, suggests that the system will fail, while Orwell's more analytically oriented book hints that it can succeed—in fact "1984" in common parlance has come to imply this proposition.

Orwell is plainly horrified at the possibility of realizing the regime's tenet of the "mutability of the past," wherein the physical record of inconvenient facts is utterly obliterated. His vision of the extinction of history has its moments of comic relief: in 1984 a principal feature of capitalism is thought to have been the *jus primae noctis.* Chiefly, however, it rocks the reader's sensibilities by showing that along with the past, part of man is destroyed: Winston tries to recapture his own suppressed humanity by seeking the last line of the antique nursery rhyme, "Oranges and Lemons." Orwell knows that totalitarianism leads toward the destruction of truth; both Zamiatin and he, that it destroys love, and that it wages irreconcilable war on the human individual.

THE NOVELISTS' approach to totalitarianism—attempting to view all its aspects as of a given moment without asking why and how it came into being—is very different from that of the historian, who seeks to explain the development of the system in each instance, and to trace its genesis through ideology to movement to the achievement and maintenance of power. The social scientists whose works have been examined are in this respect more akin to the novelists, but as previous discussion has indicated, they do try to suggest some historical explanations.

Totalitarianism, they have shown, is the monstrous child of Western civilization, and like better things which Europe has produced in the past five centuries, has been transplanted to the East—which has been, as Wittfogel shows, fertile soil for its growth. As he further demonstrates, totalitarianism represents the utter negation of the Western institutional pattern of pluralism. Friedrich and Brzezinski, however, suggest its relationship to the intellectual history of the West, in particular to the habits and tenets of democracy and Christianity. In their view, Christianity establishes the habit of "relating action programs and norms to elaborate 'rational' frameworks. These rational frameworks of theology are then secularized and become ideologies." This formal link, however, may be less vital than the substance of the transmutation. In pressing their absolutist claims, the totalitarian ideologists transferred

[8] George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four,* Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1949, 314 pp.

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the Judeo-Christian concept of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and perfect, to man (Lenin, following Marx) or a group of men ("Aryans," said Hitler), and thereafter it was easy for the leaders to act as human gods. The defense of the use of power without limit (which Friedrich and Brzezinski [p. 88] consider the *differentia specifica* of totalitarianism), the reiteration of absolute certainty (founded on the current pronouncements of the reigning pseudo-"science", and the final and crucial though not always verbalized pretension of absolute virtue—these claims underlie the totalitarian faith. No wonder both Nazis and Communists have anathematized Christianity, which reserves these attributes to God, and above all declares human weakness and wickedness to be ineluctable; for the root aim of both groups has been to transform human nature (Arendt's choice as the distinctive totalitarian element—p. 432).

Human gods cannot permit ideas different from their own, nor institutions outside of their control. The totalitarian dictators neither acknowledge in theory, nor are they subjected to in fact, any religious or moral or legal restraints whatsoever (unlike Western absolutists, Oriental despots, or any other rulers of past or present). For this reason the key phrase in Brzezinski's definition (quoted at the beginning of this paper) is "without restraint," which suggests simultaneously the ideological and institutional uniqueness of the totalitarian systems.

At the outset, many Fascists, Nazis, and especially Communists hoped that they could be, after some initial therapeutic bloodshed, gentle and effectively persuasive. Nevertheless, since their commitment was to a belief that they were absolutely right and were destined ultimately to accomplish all things, they were led, in contending with a variety of complex historical circumstances and conditions, to commit increasingly ghastly crimes. As Friedrich and Brzezinski well indicate, "totalitarian dictatorship as it actually developed was not intended by those who created it . . ." (p. 5), and although the statement is far less applicable to Hitler than to Stalin or Mussolini, or even to some of the lesser Nazis, it points to the dilemma of many in the elite parties who, when faced by their own miscalculation of the magnitude of the difficulties and the opposition facing them, were driven by the "ridiculous supersense of [their] ideological superstition" to acts from which the sane turned in utter disbelief, for "normal men do not know that everything is possible." [9]

Such acts were directed not only against "enemies" (the terror), but also against supporters (the purge). The purge developed, as Brzezinski puts it in a book of his own,[10] because the Communists had to "find a substitute for the restraints of the constitutional system [which they had] destroyed" (p. 169). If men would change as the totalitarians hope, the regimes could alter substantially, and come to rest on consent. But the system cannot destroy all foes, or all its errant and superfluous friends; there will always be more. It is postulated that war will bring peace, that the state will create anarchy, that exploitation will yield to harmony; after a time, in Orwell's vision, the future tense is abandoned, but that is all.

Like all other systems or social orders, totalitarianism is the creation of men, but men of a peculiar sort. An understanding of what men are like who believe that "everything is possible" (and thus are not, in Rousset's phrase, "normal") has eluded many scholars (as well as statesmen) in the world outside totalitarian countries. In part, the reason for this is reluctance to go beyond the study of the visible behavior and tangible creations of those (or any other) men in drawing conclusions. Yet we are willing to recognize the indications that the men who make up totalitarian parties and run totalitarian dictatorships, like the masses crushed under their rule, are made, not born—that in the totalitarians' ascent to power, there is a complex interweaving of their own drives with the aspirations of the masses. Individual desires for power, recognition, intellectual and moral certainty, economic security, and love are deeply entangled with the amplitude or lack of endowments and inheritance, frustrations, misfortunes, and exploitation which are man's lot in society. Only by looking more deeply into the human mind and soul can we aspire to understand how the totalitarian dictators—unimpeded by conscience, law, or any power outside their own—can cross the divide which we have learned to mark between humanity and bestiality.

DURING THE LAST year and a half certain developments within the Soviet orbit seemed to challenge a number of widely accepted views about totalitarianism. In 1956 came the effort of the staunch and veteran Stalinist, Khrushchev, to exorcize the incubus of his dead master, followed by the upheavals in Poland and Hungary, occasioned in part by popular perception of the uncertainty and dissension at the summit of power. In particular, the exaggerated interpretation of Khrush-

[9] The phrase, taken from David Rousset's *The Other Kingdom* (New York, 1947), is used by Hannah Arendt as an epigraph to her section on "Totalitarianism" *op. cit.*, p. 299.

[10] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski: *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956, 256 pp.

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chev's new line—reflected in the phrase "de-Stalinization" and in the incautious conclusion that the Hungarians had won, during the brief and breath-taking days when Budapest had a "neutral" government—prompted revisionist suggestions. There were exultant cries that Arthur Koestler was wrong—that the purge defendants had confessed as a result of torture, not brainwashing"; that Orwell was wrong—that the facts which had been thrust down the "memory hole" still remained alive in men's minds. The experts, it seemed, had been unduly pessimistic: a whole people in arms could dash the weapons of control from their rulers' hands.

Then came the Soviet seizure of Budapest, followed by anti-proletarian and anti-popular savagery of a kind at least equaling any exploit of the supposedly disavowed Stalin. By the end of 1956 the old assumptions seemed re-established. After all, communism was not to be fundamentally transformed by semi-reasonable men at the top, nor was it to be forcibly overthrown by masses of heroes at the bottom. Very likely, the confessions of some of the Moscow defendants, like that of Koestler's Rubashov, had been obtained by the interrogators' exercise of the "ridiculous supersense" of their "ideological superstition" (in Arendt's phrase). Doubtless many Poles and Hungarians as well as Russians still suffered from their ignorance of their own past and the foreign present, and from the endless lies they had been told—even when they disbelieved them. Although the Hungarian secret police had fallen victim to the people's revenge and the Hungarian army had joined the revolt, the Soviet military force—despite some defection in the ranks—remained at the rulers' disposal.

And yet something had been learned. The myth that the masses willingly *acquiesced* in totalitarian rule, because they wanted only full bellies, or had been successfully propagandized, was shattered by the events in Hungary—even more effectively than by the reaction of Soviet soldiers and civilians in welcoming Hitler's invasion in 1941. The contrary myth, that the people could push over the totalitarian monolith if they tried, was also a casualty—but it had never been taken very seriously anyway.

The internal structure of the Soviet system continued into 1957 to exhibit stresses and changes. On very scant evidence, it has been widely thought that a sizable proportion of concentration camp inmates has been released, that the secret police apparatus has been at least partially dismantled, and that the institution of the purge, which Brzezinski labeled as "permanent," has come to a virtual end—since Beria's death, at any rate. (The evidence does support a belief that the apparatus of terror and purge is, at least for the moment, largely inactive.) However, Khrushchev's June purge of the Presidium itself, in which more members were removed than on any single occasion in all previous Soviet history, suggests caution in such conclusions, even if Zhukov's rumored demand for a cessation of "bloodshed" should save the life of Malenkov, Molotov, *et al.*, for the time being.

OVER THE PAST four years, and especially in connection with the recent purge, the role of Marshal Zhukov has evoked increasing comment. It has been thought that no institution could operate autonomously within the centralized power structure, whose strength lay in its ability to send orders downward, displacing without difficulty the dictator's satraps who headed the chief agencies of control—as Stalin did with virtually his whole army leadership and two successive heads of his secret police, and as Malenkov and Khrushchev did with Beria. Nevertheless, the assumption has grown that Zhukov's power rests on the organized support of the army as an institution. If this is true, our views of the structure of totalitarianism must be altered. However, if he owes his climb to the use Khrushchev or he himself has made of his relatively strong personal popularity as conqueror of the Nazi armies, and not to his own organization-based power, then he is just another contender in a struggle which seems still in progress. It is likely that events may soon put this proposition to a test.

Much else hangs in the balance throughout the totalitarian world in 1957: the fate of the Gomulka experiment in Poland, the unsolved question of Tito's relations with the Kremlin, the success of Mao's endeavors simultaneously to open a controlled safety-valve for Chinese discontent and to lure his critics into self-entrapment in the opium fields of the "hundred flowers." [11]

These and other manifestations of tension clearly indicate the existence of severe stresses in the fabric of Communist totalitarianism; but it would be foolhardy to conclude that communism is headed for the kind of sudden collapse that overtook nazism and fascism under war conditions. It is still a far more powerful force in the world than were the other totalitarian systems of our century, its bases vastly more far-flung, its threat to freedom more grave.

[11] The reference is to Mao Tse-tung's now famous phrase, "Let the hundred flowers blossom, let the hundred schools of thought contend," in his speech of May 1956.

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Reflections on "Total Statism"

R. A. Bauer, A. Inkeles, C. Kluckhohn:
How the Soviet System Works,
Harvard University Press, 1956.

Reviewed by Robert C. Tucker

IN 1950 the Russian Research Center at Harvard set out to learn more about the Soviet system from a uniquely informative source—people who had lived under it. Interviews were conducted with a large number of former Soviet citizens residing in Europe and America, most of whom left or were deported from the USSR during World War II and later elected not to return. The project's principal purpose was to form a clear picture of how the Soviet system looks "from the inside" and to assess its sociological strengths and weaknesses. The present volume, in which the research results are summarized and interpreted by the former Director of the Center, Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, and by Drs. Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, is a slightly revised later version of a report completed in 1954.

The study is considerably more ambitious in scope than this introduction might suggest. It undertakes to develop a comprehensive theoretical conception of the nature of the Soviet system from the standpoint of what the authors call "social systems analysis." Since the life of the project spanned the great turning point of recent Soviet history—Stalin's death—the study also attempts to deal with the phenomenon of change in post-Stalin Russia. It comments on such matters of current interest as the viability of collective rule, the changing role of the military leadership in the Soviet regime, the shifts in Soviet foreign policy, and the prospects for future internal change.

In the first section, the authors develop their theoretical model. The Soviet system, they point out, may be more accurately described as "total statism" than as "socialism" or "communism." They discuss its nature by reference to eight "formal" or "operating characteristics," such as "Creating and Maintaining Myths," "Planning and Controlling," "Overcommitment of Resources," "Terror and Forced Labor," and so on. They imply that the Soviet system may be viewed for scientific purposes as a great impersonal societal mechanism which functions pretty much on the order of an engine, having its own characteristic operational tendencies, qualities of performance, specific deficiencies, and peculiar modes of semi-automatic adjustment to these deficiencies. How this system came into being is a question which receives next to no attention. The study simply speaks of the operating characteristics as an outgrowth of the "Bolshevik mentality," viewed as something which is essentially constant. This approach raises some questions which will be dealt with shortly.

The middle parts of the book comprise its most significant contribution, presenting the substance of the research findings on popular attitudes. Especially commendable for its treatment of a difficult subject is the chapter on attitudes among the non-Russian nationalities. It points out that over-simplification of the issues presented by the non-Russian ethnic minorities in the USSR can be dangerous to Western policy. Nationality feeling exists and is of genuine importance in a number of these groups. However, they "feel the same resentments toward the regime and the same dissatisfactions with the system as other citizens of the USSR, although they may feel them somewhat more intensely." The inference is that anti-Russian feeling among the non-Russian Soviet nationalities should not be looked to as a major political force in its own right (in the reviewer's opinion, Georgia might be the exception to this rule).

On the whole, the responses of the Soviet refugees confirm a number of suppositions long entertained by Western observers of the USSR. The peasant is shown to be generally unreconciled to the *kolkhoz* (which he views as a form of serfdom), the worker to be dissatisfied with his material conditions, the white collar man to have grievances of his own although he is better off in some ways than the worker and peasant, and the people in general to be filled with revulsion for terror

Mr. Tucker, formerly Editor of the Anglo-American Joint Press Reading Service in Moscow, is now a consultant of the Social Science Division of the RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C. The review above reflects his specialized interest in problems of the psychology and politics of totalitarianism, as did his last article in this publication, "The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy" (No. 3, May-June, 1957).

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and with hatred for the secret police. These opinion data provide a useful background for understanding some recent developments which have excited much interest and no little surprise in the West, such as the student unrest and the warm popular reception of Dudintsev's criticism of Soviet life in the novel *Not By Bread Alone*.

Such developments, however, raise questions about the book's assessment of the outlook of Soviet youth. From interview data indicating that the younger generation is (or was in the late 1930's) "more accepting" of Soviet reality than the older people ("The younger people appear to question less, and to question less deeply when they do"), it conditionally infers that "the Soviet regime may expect to increase the breadth and stability of its social support with the passage of time . . ." One wonders if the authors might not now be inclined to temper their conclusion in the light of recent signs that oppositional tendencies are sharpest precisely among some circles of Soviet university youth. The truth seems to be that it is risky to generalize about the youth. If acceptance of Soviet conditions is greatest among some elements of it, the demand for fundamental reform is most courageously expressed by others.

Summing up their interpretation of the popular attitude, the authors write:

> We have often been tempted to state that the alienated Soviet citizen accepts the system and rejects the regime. By this we mean that hostility is focused selectively on the men who run the system rather than on the institutional forms of the system.

This is an over-simplification, they add, for the people also reject such features of the system itself as the *kolkhoz* and the secret police.

But even as thus qualified, the position seems questionable; in the opinion of the present reviewer, it does not accurately represent the way the ordinary person in Soviet Russia actually thinks. The distinction between "regime" and "system" does not come naturally to him—and for good reason. When he speaks of *Sovietskaia vlast* (the Soviet regime), he does not mean simply the men in the Kremlin but, broadly, the massive governmental organism of power in the setup of total statism. It is the political personification and driving force of *Sovietskii stroi* (Soviet system). Consequently, alienation from the regime tends to blend into an alienation from the system, from "the way things are." This does not mean, however, that the alienated citizen has a clear conception of the alternative which he would desire. Political circumstances have prevented the latter issue from becoming real for him, and the natural tendency of his thinking has been simply to concern itself with the things which he does *not* like, which he finds oppressive, in Soviet life. However, insofar as any alternative setup may be dimly visualized in the popular consciousness, it is hardly a reincarnation of the Russia of 1916. If there were any lingering doubt about this, data offered in the present volume should dispel it.

While there is no clear differentiation in the popular mind, between "regime" and "system", there is another distinction of which many people in Soviet Russia are keenly conscious. This might be described as the distinction between Sovietism in theory and Sovietism in practice. It derives from the ordinary person's comparison of Soviet life as he experiences it with the beautiful picture painted in propaganda which advertises the Soviet system as the realization of man's best ideals, as the open sesame to national progress and prosperity, etc. He becomes aware of a great rift between the way things are supposed to be and the way they actually are: He is living in a hardship state which officially presents itself to him and to the world as a welfare state. "It is all very attractive on paper," he may therefore tell you, "but look at the reality." It is in this limited sense that he accepts the "theory."

Apparently it is in part this characteristic popular response which has led the authors of the present volume to adopt their dichotomy of regime and system. That is, they tend to construe the citizen's viewpoint—"It is all very attractive on paper"—as basic acceptance of the system. For example, after noting (on page 223) "the rather widespread acceptance of the *basic principles* of the authoritarian welfare state," the authors proceed to say a few lines later: "Most Soviet citizens appear to accept and approve the *basic structure of the Soviet welfare state*" (italics added). Thus, acceptance of "basic principles" turns into acceptance of "basic structure." This approach fails to take account of the citizen's consciousness of the rift between Sovietism *in theory* and Sovietism *in practice*, between the system as propagandized (the welfare state) and the system as lived (the hardship state). On the other hand, it reinforces the view about a dichotomy of rejected regime and accepted system.

This point deserves stressing if only because the view in question influences a "pessimistic finding" of the study, to wit:

> The new regime can gain much more solid popular support if it supplies more consumer goods and better housing, eases up on the terror, makes some concessions to the peasants, and relieves somewhat the frantic pace at which the whole population has been driven.

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In other words, feeling as they do that the citizen basically accepts the system, the authors infer that the regime, too, can gain a large measure of popular acceptance at fairly small cost through concessions to the people without becoming, as they later put it, any "less totalitarian." They add in a further statement:

> The regime can apparently acquire large increments of good will and secure substantially improved morale by relatively modest improvements in the flow of food and hard goods, if these are *steady* and appear to be harbingers of more to come.

Some of the concessions which the authors list have already been made in the post-Stalin period, and no one familiar with Russia would deny that people there feel better about life as a result, for instance, of the decline of terror, the relieving of the pace, the increased attention to housing, and so forth. But the evidence also shows that a great deal more change and more fundamental change than this would be required to repair the relations between regime and people. The Dudintsev novel, for example, represents far more than a demand for modest and steady improvements in the flow of food and hard goods. It reflects a moral protest against practices and manners rooted deep in the Soviet system of bureaucratized society, an implicit demand for a thorough renovation of the national life in the direction of decency and liberality and human dignity. The enthusiastic popular response to the novel (and the official attack on it) suggests that Dudintsev has touched on issues filled with vital meaning for very large numbers of people in Soviet Russia. These are moral issues, but, as he hints at the close of the novel, they are destined to become political. There may be ground for optimism in this.

In the final part of the book, the authors sum up their impressions and address themselves to the question: Whither Russia? The discussion here is strewn with pertinent observations but, in this reviewer's opinion, is not on the whole illuminating. For it fails to clarify the significance of the manifest fact that Russia today is in flux. It concludes with the prediction for the short run that "at 'worst' the present regime may revert to Stalinism and at 'best' it may become a more popular, or at least less resented, but no less totalitarian government."

So far as the first alternative is concerned, the reader may well be puzzled. For the earlier chapters have not explained that Soviet Russia was ever in the grip of something called "Stalinism" or why and how the post-Stalin regime had departed from it. They have dealt with a more or less constant "Soviet system" which has certain more or less constant "operating characteristics" expressing a more or less constant "Bolshevik mentality." Indeed, the first reference to "Stalinism" occurs in a statement in the last chapter (p. 239), that we may see a "gradual reversion" to it. And this points to a fundamental difficulty in the conceptual scheme of the work. It offers a static model of the Soviet system. There is nothing in this model which would explain why the system is changing (to the degree and in the manner that it has) and why, in particular, this process of change was inaugurated by the death of Stalin.

Briefly, the Soviet period must be apprehended in historical terms. The system must be seen as something which evolved in a succession of phases. Stalinism, which went through a series of phases itself, involved a break of political and mental continuity with the Bolshevist past in Soviet Russia, a break which Stalin himself belatedly recognized in symbolic form when, in 1952, he banned the very word "Bolshevik" in official usage. Bolshevism as a political force and ruling mentality virtually perished in the NKVD cellars of 1937-38 or in the concentration camps. The original party dictatorship was succeeded by the Stalinist system, the crucial characteristic of which, as of all true totalitarianisms, was the dominating influence of the sick personality of the *Fuehrer*. This, essentially, is why Stalin's death necessarily plunged the country into a period of change. His death itself was the key change. Among the real political questions which it posed, incidentally, was the question of whether and how far the new regime would try to revert to Bolshevism.

Our scholarship is plagued to this day by the failure to comprehend Stalinism as a special system and mental formation, something psychologically distinct from what went before even though it resembled it in many ways and held on, almost to the end, to the myth of continuity. The assumption of an historical constancy of Bolshevism or "Bolshevik mentality" is one which the present study shares with a number of other contemporary works of scholarship in this field. This prevents it from grasping the Stalinist system as Stalinist, and therefore from coming to close interpretive grips with the phenomenon of Soviet change after Stalin.

Despite the issue raised here, the volume is one which no student of contemporary Soviet Russia should overlook. As the authors themselves suggest, it makes its distinctive contribution in the presentation to the public of new material on the attitudes, life experience, and patterns of adjustment of the Soviet citizen; this is a serious and valuable contribution. The material is drawn largely from refugees' memories of the past. But in Russia as everywhere, past is prologue.

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The Soviet Bond Hoax

By Franklyn D. Holzman

ON APRIL 8, 1957, Communist Party leader Khrushchev announced that the Soviet government plans to postpone for 20 to 25 years interest payments on and repayments of the 260 billion rubles' worth of government debt held by the people of the USSR.[1] Such a freezing of governmental obligations would be a hardship on the populace of any country. For the Soviet citizen it must constitute a major economic blow, since the average household probably has in its possession bonds with a face value of 6 or 7 thousand rubles; this amounts to roughly half of its annual income (1½ persons working at 8500 rubles per year)—a huge sum of inconvertible "assets" for a people whose living standard is severely depressed.

Khrushchev also announced that beginning in 1958 sales of bonds to the population would be discontinued. Since workers and peasants are forced to buy bonds whether they want to or not, this move might seem at first glance to be a cause for their rejoicing. However, the reduction in government receipts due to discontinuance of bond sales could benefit the people only if the government were willing to curtail part of its military and industrial development program; in the absence of such a curtailment—and there is no indication that one is contemplated—it seems likely that the regime will be forced to increase taxes to compensate for the loss of bond revenues.

The decision of the Soviet government to renege on its debt obligation, for at least a generation and perhaps forever, is one which could only be made under a totalitarian system. It is true that many democratic governments have, in the past, canceled or exchanged at very disadvantageous rates not only bonds but cash currency as well. But these moves have typically occurred during runaway inflations caused by war, revolution, or other great crises. Under such circumstances, old money and bonds are worthless anyway, and this in part is the reason for currency reforms. The Soviets are not defaulting on bonds because they are worthless. On the contrary, they are defaulting because the bonds are worth too much. Repayment of bonds would mean eventually a large increase in consumer purchasing power, necessitating again either a rise in taxes or the production of more consumer goods and less military and industrial commodities—neither a particularly desirable alternative to Moscow.

[1] *Pravda*, April 10, 1957, p. 2. (4 rubles = $1.00, official rate).

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While the present default is the most dramatic event in Soviet bond policy of the past ten years, it is not the first time the government has gone back on its promises to bondholders. In order to understand better the significance of the default of April 8, it is necessary to describe briefly the nature and history of Soviet bonds.[2]

Loans and Lotteries

The present Soviet system of so-called "mass-subscription loans" was introduced in 1927, coinciding with the initiation of Stalin's stepped-up industrialization program and constituting one of several important measures taken by the government to finance its huge outlays on heavy industry. The issue of 1927 was, in fact, called the First Industrialization Loan. It was valued at 200 million rubles, small in comparison with recent issues, had a 10-year maturity, and paid 13 percent interest. Thereafter, a large "mass-subscription loan" was floated annually.

Since the early 1930's Soviet bonds have differed in one important respect from bonds in most other countries. Apparently in order to stimulate sales, the Soviet regime adopted the technique of distributing the annual interest accrual among a small percentage of bondholders chosen by lot. After winning a prize, a bondholder is no longer eligible for further lotteries connected with the particular bond issue, and his bond is redeemed. At present, only one out of every four bondholders wins a prize, the remaining three simply getting back the nominal value of their bonds after 20 years. The lottery prizes vary in size, with a few lucky individuals winning as much as 25 and 50 thousand rubles. Lottery winnings are tax exempt.[3]

The present moratorium on servicing the government debt is not the first but rather the fifth in Soviet history. The first was put into effect in 1930. At that time, the four previous issues, paying from 11 to 13 percent interest on a total value of 1,650 million rubles, were converted to a new 10-year 10 percent loan with no allowance made for the time the bonds already had been held. The second conver-

[2] The information which follows is condensed from the author's *Soviet Taxation: The Fiscal and Monetary Problems of a Planned Economy*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 1955, pp. 200-8. Unless otherwise noted, the facts and figures cited are from this study, which is based almost entirely on Soviet sources.

[3] Descriptions of Soviet lotteries are contained in almost all books on Soviet finance; see, for example, A. V. Bachurin, *Finansy i kredit SSSR* (Finance and Credit of the USSR), Moscow, 1953, p. 210.

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sion occurred in 1936. Again new bonds were issued replacing the old. This time interest rates were further reduced to 4 percent and all bonds, regardless of their original due date, were made payable in 20 years—that is, in 1956. A third and smaller conversion of similar character occurred in 1938. The fourth and most important default occurred as part of the major currency reform of 1947, which had as its purpose wiping out wartime inflation. In line with this objective, the major provision of the reform was the calling in of all cash currency outstanding and exchanging one new ruble for ten old rubles. With respect to bonds, the provisions were somewhat less drastic, but nevertheless severe enough. Each bondholder was given one new bond for every three old bonds turned in, the interest rate was lowered from 4 to 2 percent, and maturities were again extended for 20 years—to 1967. The chances are, therefore, that a Soviet worker or peasant who had bought a bond in 1927 which returned 13 percent interest annually and which was to be redeemed in 1937, ended up in 1947 with one-third of a bond redeemable in 1967. It seems clear that the plight of the Soviet bondholder was not an enviable one even before the latest default of last April.

Forced Purchase Without Pay-off

Soviet bond sales to the population are essentially *compulsory* rather than *voluntary* loans. Direct evidence of this fact is afforded by the testimony of former citizens of the USSR, who report quite consistently that strong pressure is exerted on workers to subscribe from two to four weeks' salary every year. This amount checks with the data available from Soviet sources. In 1940, for example, wages paid out to the population totalled 161 billion rubles. Purchases of bonds amounted to 9.2 billion rubles, or an average of about 2.9 weeks' salary.[4]

The element of compulsion can be deduced indirectly in a variety of ways. It has been established beyond doubt that despite the tremendous advances achieved by the Soviets in technology and in the production of basic military and industrial commodities, the standard of living of the population was one close to destitution for many years; in the last decade it has risen but still remains at a very low level. On this ground, one would not expect the people to have much in the way of surplus funds to invest in government bonds. Yet, every year, 5 or 6 percent of personal income is so invested. That the Soviet people would voluntarily spend this much for bonds would be difficult to believe even if the government made no other claims upon them. In fact, however, the Soviet citizen pays more to his government than the people of any other country in the world. Since 1930, between 45 and 60 percent of personal income, excluding bonds sales has been handed over to the state in the form of taxes. To use the year 1940 again for illustrative purposes, of 236 billion rubles of money income, 136 billion or almost 56 percent went for taxes.[5]

It could be argued that even with low incomes and high taxes, Soviet workers were willing to buy bonds—at least before 1936—because of the very high interest returns of from 8 to 13 percent. This might have been the case had consumer goods prices either remained stable or risen at a slower annual rate than the rate of interest. (That is to say, if a 100-ruble bond pays a nominal rate of interest of 13 percent, it is worth 113 rubles at the end of a year; if prices should rise over the year by 13 percent, the full gain is wiped out, and the "real" rate of interest in terms of purchasing power is zero.) In fact, throughout the prewar and wartime periods, the Soviet economy suffered a galloping inflation. Consumer goods prices rose at an average annual rate of 22 percent from 1928 to 1937 and 14 percent from 1928 to 1948.[6] It is clear that even with the high nominal rates of interest of the late 1920's and early 1930's Soviet bonds were a poor investment and were worth less in purchasing power upon redemption than when they were originally bought.

Still another undesirable feature of Soviet bonds is their inconvertibility; they are not redeemable upon demand but only, as noted earlier, in the unlikely event that the owner wins a lottery. The fact that money used to purchase bonds was "sunk" for some 10 or 20 years offers further reason to believe that the average Soviet citizen would not have invested in them except under pressure.[7]

Finally, it might be pointed out that the bonds have not been sold at banks or other places where the population might come voluntarily to buy them.[8] Rather, subscriptions have been solicited (perhaps "required" is the more appropriate word) at places of work and paid for over a 10-month period, as with the income tax, by automatic deductions from wages.

Taxation and Inflation

Against this background, the implications and effects of the regime's latest action can be more easily seen. Specifically two questions arise: (1) Why did the Soviets, after having compelled their people to buy bonds for 30 years, suddenly decide to discontinue the practice? (2) Why did they also decide to default at the present time on payments on bonds outstanding?

In answer to question (1) it is this writer's view that the essential nature of the Soviet bond changed in 1947: before that year the bonds were really a species of tax and not at all a voluntary purchase in the usual sense; since 1947, however, the tax element has been substantially reduced if not almost eliminated.

Let us assume that in 1930 the government pressured a worker to subscribe to a 10-percent bond, which after 10 years would have had a redemption value of 100 rubles. At 10 percent, the value of the bond at the time of purchase would have been 39 rubles; this is the amount the worker

[4] Holzman, *op. cit.*, Chapters 9 and 10.
[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Cf. Janet Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928-1948", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, (Cambridge) May 1954, p. 143; and Naum Jasny, *The Soviet Economy During the Plan Era* (Stanford University Press) 1951, p. 58.

[7] The need for inconvertibility is easily explained: With prices rising as they have, the bonds would have been cashed in as fast as the workers were forced to subscribe.

[8] There is one exception: the so-called "cash" or "voluntary-purchase" bonds which are akin to United States "E" bonds. These are still being sold in the USSR but they constitute only a small percentage of total bonds outstanding.

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would have had to hand over to the state. Let us further suppose that the worker would have bought the bond voluntarily only if the price had been 25 rubles (the 1930 value at 15 percent interest) rather than 39 rubles. The worker who was forced to buy the bond was in effect taxed 14 rubles—*i.e.,* the amount he had to pay over and above that which he was willing to pay.

Let us suppose now that prices rose—as indeed they did—by about 500 percent from 1930 to 1940, and that the worker had anticipated this. By 1940, 100 rubles would have been worth only one-fifth of the 1930 real value in terms of purchasing power. The worker, if he had properly estimated the situation, would have been willing to pay only one-fifth of 25 rubles, or roughly 5 rubles for the bond. Taking inflation into account, then, the tax element of the original investments would become 34 rubles, the voluntary payment 5 rubles. The series of conversions and other undesirable features of the bonds would increase the tax element still further.

While the above estimates are of course crude,[9] there can be no doubt that the Soviet mass-subscription loans of 1927 through 1947 were predominantly *taxes.* Few people ever recovered their interest or principal. Even if they were among the "fortunates" who won a lottery, the money they received from the state was worth only a fraction of the money originally handed over. As already indicated, the average bondholder who had bought, say, a 30-ruble bond in 1927 paying 13 percent and redeemable in 1937, ended up in 1947 owning 10 rubles of that bond with a purchasing power of less than a ruble, paying only 2 percent and not redeemable until 1967.

Since 1947, the situation has been different. Mass subscription loans have still been forced upon the population, the interest rate is low, and bonds are not redeemable upon demand. But while the standard of living is still low, it has been rising steadily over the past ten years, probably generating a genuine desire to save among the more prosperous elements of the population. Most important, however, is the fact that open inflation has finally been halted. In fact, a planned deflation has been in effect since 1948. By 1956, consumer goods prices had been cut to less than half the 1947 level.[10]

From the point of view of the bondholder, this was fine. If he won a lottery and got back his principal along with the lottery prize, the money had much more purchasing power than when it was deducted from his wages. Even if he didn't win a lottery, in twenty years he stood to recapture a real nest egg, possibly worth two or three times what he had paid for it.

From the state's point of view, things were not so rosy. While before 1947, the government was in a position to take 100 rubles away from a worker and to pay him back at some distant date about 10 rubles worth of goods, the present picture is one in which the same 100 rubles has to be repaid with 200 to 300 rubles' worth of goods. Clearly, bonds have ceased to be taxes from the state's point of view. This is the basic reason behind the discontinuance of sales of bonds.[11]

Long-Range Aims

Why the Soviets defaulted on their bonds at this time is a much harder question to answer. Some commentators point out that despite the planned deflation since 1948, inflationary pressures continue to plague the Soviet economy due to the goods shortage; thus they argue that the Soviet action of April 8 was designed to have an immediate anti-inflationary impact. This explanation must be rejected. For while it is true that defaulting on the interest and redemptions of lottery winners' bonds reduces the population's purchasing power, this reduction is more than offset by the discontinuance of sales of new bonds. In 1957, for example, the population is scheduled to hand over 26 billion rubles for new bonds, receiving only 16 billion in interest and redemptions.[12] Khrushchev's action, had it taken effect this year, would have had a net *inflationary* impact of 10 billion rubles.

Over the long run, however—and this may be the real motive behind the measure—the present default will indeed be anti-inflationary, since in 1967, and each year thereafter, the regime would have had to pay off the 20-year loans floated from 1947 to the present, amounting to more than its income from new subscriptions (unless these were to be raised suddenly by very large amounts). One may legitimately question why the Soviet regime should take an action which adds to current inflationary pressures in order to help achieve an anti-inflationary objective ten years to the future. No conclusive answer to this question can be offered. However, it is worth noting that the action is at least consistent with past practice, since all of the conversions of the 1930's were accomplished many years in advance of redemption dates.

As a final point, the political nature of the default and the discontinuance of bond sales is worth noting. Essentially, the action of April 8 benefits the younger generation and penalizes the older. The younger generation has everything to gain and little to lose: their bond holdings are relatively small and they stand to have their annual take-home pay increased by from two to four weeks' wages, (unless, of course the government substitutes another form of taxation for bond sales). While the older people will also benefit by the discontinuance of further bond sales, it is they who own the bulk of the 260 billion rubles' worth of bonds which have just been converted into so much wallpaper. The action of April 8, then, seems to have been calculated to win friends among the younger people at the expense of the older.

The extent to which this socio-political factor weighed in the regime's action is, however, impossible to judge; as with other ramifications of the measure, only time and the future course of Soviet fiscal policy will reveal the full motivations behind its enactment. Meantime the Soviet citizen must accept the enforced devaluation of his bonds as meekly as he accepted their enforced purchase in the first place.

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[9] A more precise estimate of the tax element is contained in this writer's "An Estimate of the Tax Element in Soviet Bonds", *American Economic Review* (Evanston, Ill.), June, 1957.

[10] *Cf. Narodnoe Khaziaistvo SSSR* (National Economy of the USSR) Moscow, 1956, pp. 210-11.

[11] It was on these grounds that the writer predicted (in 1953) the discontinuance of bond sales. *Cf. Soviet Taxation,* pp. 207-8.

[12] Khrushchev's speech in *Pravda,* April 10, 1957, p. 2.

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The Rise of a Secretary

WHATEVER THE ULTIMATE outcome of the power struggle which Stalin's heirs have been waging behind the outward facade of "collective leadership," there is little question that Khrushchev's spectacular victory at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee elevated him to a position of individual authority clearly surpassing anything so far seen in post-Stalin Russia. Indeed, many competent observers see a close similarity, in degree of personal power, between Khrushchev's position today and Stalin's around 1930 after the former dictator had successfully emasculated the "collective leadership" established upon the death of Lenin.

But while the more manifest signs of Khrushchev's growing power have been duly noted outside the Soviet Union, little attention has been paid to a body of evidence bearing upon what this writer considers a particularly significant aspect of the Kremlin power struggle. It relates, specifically, to Khrushchev's gradual advance toward inheritance, if not deliberate conquest, of the autocratic authority which had come to be symbolized, in Stalin's lifetime, by the post of "general secretary of the Central Committee." The evidences cited may appear elusive and insubstantial; they cannot, however, be overlooked in a system where a significant change in a leader's real power may be signalled by a seemingly inconsequential alteration of his publicly used title rather than by any modification of his statutory authority.

TO PREFACE this line of inquiry, it is necessary to recall the place of the general secretaryship in the history of the CPSU and its overshadowing importance in the Stalin succession crisis. No one but Stalin ever held this title after its creation in 1922. By using this office for his personal advantage, he was able to pack the Central Committee with his supporters, undermine the collective leadership, and acquire dictatorial power within several years after Lenin's death. By the 1930's the title had become the symbol of Stalin's hegemony in the party. Subsequently, during the heyday of Stalinist terror, the title was little used to designate the source of his authority, but after the purges had removed the chief witnesses of his appointment to the secretaryship, it became the subject of a new myth. Stalin's official biography, written for his sixtieth birthday (1939), claimed that it was Lenin who had nominated him for the post, the obvious implication being that as general secretary he became the sole legitimate heir to Lenin's authority.

Thus, when Stalin died in March 1953, who, if anyone, would succeed to this symbolic title became the all-important question in Soviet politics. If the oligarchy which had formed at the onset of Stalin's fatal illness was not to be superseded by a new dictatorship, its members had to forestall the possibility that one of them, by virtue of being accorded Stalin's title and dominating power in the Central Committee, could claim to be his legitimate successor and then use his controlling position to subvert the oligarchy and reestablish a personal dictatorship.

A CLUE TO the extreme concern of the oligarchy over this central problem was furnished immediately by the official obituaries for the dead dictator. Were these to recall Stalin's incumbency of the post of general secretary of the Central Committee, they necessarily would pose the question of who would succeed to this high office. The oligarchs sought, therefore, to evade the issue by silence. In all the torrent of eulogies reviewing Stalin's political career, nowhere was mention made of a fact that was stressed by his biographies hitherto—his post as general secretary.[1]

The sweeping charges in both government and party effected in the weeks immediately following Stalin's death further testified to this concern. Initially it appeared that Malenkov, in addition to assuming the premiership, would also remain as ranking secretary of the Central Committee. However, when this body met briefly ten days after Stalin's death, Malenkov relinquished the latter post, and Khrushchev led a new list of five "secretaries", none of whom was given any distinguishing title.

When the Central Committee next met in July 1953 to hear Malenkov report, for the CC Presidium, on the purge of Beria, Khrushchev still remained an ordinary secretary. Only in September 1953 was he upgraded above the other members of the secretariat by being elected "first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU," a title which had never before been used. It was apparently designed to suggest that his authority corresponded to that of "first secretaries" in the local party committees, though the device was clumsy since the CPSU Central Committee—unlike the local party bodies—had, and still has, no "second secretary". Khrushchev was still far from inheriting Stalin's authority as general secretary, but at least he had advanced one step toward that goal.

[1] In 1955, after the fall of Malenkov, there was even an interesting effort—probably inspired by Khrushchev's opponents—to rewrite history so as to prove that the office of general secretary had not simply lapsed temporarily with Stalin's death, but had already ceased to exist during his lifetime. Cf. the article on Stalin in the November 1953 printing of *Kratkii Filosofskii Slovar* (Short Philosophical Dictionary) and the same "revised" item in the July 1955 printing.

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As "first secretary" Khrushchev consolidated his party position until he was able to play a key role in engineering Malenkov's downfall. Not long thereafter, there were significant indications that his ambitions were growing. In March 1955, an article on Khrushchev in the *Encyclopedic Dictionary* referred to him as *"one of the closest* comrades-in-arms of Stalin," (emphasis supplied) while other Presidium members were described merely as Stalin's "comrades-in-arms." In April, the party published a book called *Lenin,* commemorating the latter's birthday. Significantly, the writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev were quoted on the last pages. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether these two seemingly minor items appeared purely by accident.

The same may be said about another curious development that took place a month later. Until that time, Soviet newspapers had referred to Khrushchev as *first* secretary of the Central Committee. In May 1955, however, they began to capitalize the initial letter of his title, calling him *First* secretary. This practice was later adopted by the Central Committee itself, when it re-elected Khrushchev after the Twentieth Congress in February 1956. By this trivial yet highly symbolic device, Khrushchev acquired a unique secretarial title, which distinguished him from the numerous "first secretaries" on other echelons of the party hierarchy.

It is interesting to note that in the interim period Khrushchev made an attempt to reach even higher—namely, to capture the very title of "general secretary," which had become taboo for the Soviet press since Stalin's death. A New Zealand official who had enjoyed Khrushchev's hospitality sent him a letter of thanks in which, instead of addressing Khrushchev as "First secretary," he chose to call him "General Secretary." The error, which inadvertently touched upon a dangerously sensitive area of Soviet politics, was not relegated to the files where such letters usually end up; instead, it was published on the front page of virtually every central and important provincial newspaper in the USSR, and was broadcast by Radio Moscow.

KHRUSHCHEV'S AMBITIONS to build up his secretarial post were resisted, of course, as the entire checkered history of the Kremlin power-struggle so strongly implies. Of interest in the context of this article is one indirect proof of the effort on the part of the Presidium members to limit the secretary's power and to maintain the supremacy of the Presidium over the Secretariat. It appeared in *Pravda* of April 20, 1955, and consisted of the recollections by a former Politburo candidate, G.I. Petrovsky, who had been exiled by Stalin and resurrected by the new leadership in its attempt to obtain the "voluntary" support of the surviving "Old Bolsheviks." In his article, Petrovsky reminded his readers of Lenin's insistence that "the Secretary" is subordinate to the Politburo, whose members are all "equal".

The opponents' efforts, however, proved to be futile. Not only was Khrushchev able to staff his Secretariat—and even, to some extent, the Presidium [2]—with his own partisans, but he also succeeded in having the Central Committee formalize his position as head of the Secretariat. Thus, before the Twentieth Congress, all members of the Secretariat were listed in order of rank. Yet at the Congress, the newly-elected Secretariat was presented with Khrushchev occupying the first place on the list, the other secretaries following in alphabetical order. This innovation, which became standard practice, has not yet been followed by the custom (as it had been in regard to Stalin) of listing Khrushchev at the head of the Presidium, with the other members following in alphabetical order. True, shortly before the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU the Congress of the Kazakh party elected to its "honorary" presidium "members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU headed by the first secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev." And shortly after the Congress, a biography of Khrushchev asserted that he "headed the Ukrainian party organization" after its Central Committee elected him first secretary in 1938—thus implying, by analogy, that Khrushchev now "headed" the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the First secretary of its Central Committee. Nonetheless these assertions, however significant, remained isolated cases, indicating that Khrushchev's position at the time of the Twentieth Congress was still not strong enough for his final and most emphatic claim to authority.

WHAT ABOUT the most recent developments, however? We know, of course, that Khrushchev was hard at work to assert his power in the months preceding the June Plenum. Discussion of the "theses of Khrushchev's report" on reorganization of the Soviet economy daily filled the columns of Soviet newspapers with Khrushchev's name. Scarcely more than a week after the theses were published Khrushchev received an unusual award for his "outstanding services" in connection with the virgin lands program, then three years old (April 8). His telegrams to local leaders commending them for their fine work began to appear on the newspapers' front pages. He received Western journalists for long interviews, answered their questions without deferring to the opinions of his colleagues, and published these interviews in the press. This assertive trend culminated in the ouster of his most formidable opponents, and in the creation of a new Presidium, largely staffed by Khrushchev's supporters.

Yet will Khrushchev's victory be fully consummated? Will it be symbolized by a title placing him at the head of the party? The near future may provide the answers to these perplexing questions—answers that will affect the fate of Russia and the world at large.

Myron Rush

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[2] In July 1955 Khrushchev succeeded in having the Central Committee elected Suslov and Kirichenko to the Presidium of the CPSU.

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Correspondence

EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism*. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, U.S. Information Agency, 1728 L St. N.W., Washington 25, D.C.

THE SOVIET YOUTH PROBLEM

I have read with interest S. V. and P. Utechin's "Patterns of Nonconformity" (No. 3, May-June 1957). . . . As a student of Soviet youth organization and one who has had some recent contact with young people in the USSR, I should like to express the belief that the Utechins exaggerate . . . [youth unrest].

The Utechins base their argument of "widespread unrest" among Soviet youth on a number of Soviet press reports calling for more indoctrination of youth, on a far greater number of Western sources, including the French Foreign Minister speaking before the executive of a party locked in perpetual struggle with Communists, and on several equally "dispassionate" London dailies.

The cryptic Soviet press reports on the subject are of unquestionable importance. We must either take them to mean that political dissent is so rife among Soviet students that the matter can no longer be concealed, or that the party leaders desire to arrest an infection before it spreads. On the basis of my recent talks with Soviet students I am inclined to accept the latter interpretation. More than once I was told that only handfuls of students are taking part in the discussion groups, which work in the spirit of what the Utechins properly call "the Marxist tradition in its true 'Leninist' and social democratic varieties." The issue of a multi-party system, that fundamental and lone assurance against tyranny, was, according to my student acquaintances, "not a present day question" *(neaktualnyi vopros)*.

I was left with the impression that the Soviet leaders have by no means lost their grip on the minds of the youthful populace of the USSR. It would be foolhardy to imagine that schematic textbooks, conformist professors and isolation from the outside world have not had a profound impact on this youth's thought, or rather its method of thinking. And if some of them should apply the crude analysis of capitalist society which they find in their textbooks to the economic processes in their own country, as was done by those noted in the *Forum* letter, they antagonize to no small degree their chauvinist-minded colleagues. Indeed, we may presume that the *Forum* letter was attacked by *Komsomolskaia Pravda* in June 1957 so as to compromise "the demagogues" as handmaidens of "our foreign ill-wishers," to use a Khrushchevian expression. . . .

Brooklyn, New York **S. Ploss**

The Utechins reply: . . . As far as our sources are concerned, we find on a rough count of the text that 33 references are taken from the Soviet press and 26 from Western sources: there is thus not "a far greater number of Western sources". Moreover, the Soviet sources quoted do not merely "call for more indoctrination of youth," but are reports of things that have been said, written or done by Soviet youth. In the case of the London dailies quoted, we know the original sources of almost all these reports, and they are reliable. As to Mr. Ploss' suggestion that Monsieur Pineau could have invented the incident referred to in order to score a political point within his own country, we find it outrageous.

For the rest, the difference between Mr. Ploss and ourselves rests simply on the conclusions he has drawn from his conversations with some Soviet citizens, and [those] we have drawn from studying the Soviet press and conversing with [other] Soviet citizens and reputable Westerners returned from Russia. It may be of interest that, in contradiction to Mr. Ploss' view, we were told by an Englishman recently returned from Russia—a knowledgeable student of Soviet affairs and an entirely trustworthy person—that in his opinion our article very much underestimated the situation.

Finally, nowhere did we state, or intend to give the impression, that a majority of students are taking part in the various discussion groups. And it is interesting but not surprising to hear that Mr. Ploss' acquaintances spoke of a multi-party system as "not a present-day question (the "present-day" is surely significant): there are a good many things to be achieved in Russia before a multi-party system can become a matter of practical politics—did we anywhere suggest that Soviet youth thinks otherwise? . . .

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